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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Effects of the Political Landscape on Social  
 
Movement Organization Tactical Choice 
 
 
by 
 
 
Jennifer M. Swalboski, Master of Science 
 
Utah State University, 2012 
 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Douglas Jackson-Smith 
Department: Sociology 
 
 
The majority of sociological research on social movement tactics and strategies 
has focused on how theories of resource mobilization and dynamic political opportunities 
affect the innovation of tactics and types of tactics used.  Relatively few studies have 
explored the roles of institutional, cultural, and political contexts in determining why 
social movement leaders choose certain tactics.  This research study examines lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) social movement organizations (SMO) that are 
pursuing institutional advocacy.  Specifically, it is a comparative case study of how 
tactics of LGBT organizations in Minnesota and Utah are affected by contested and 
conservative political landscapes, respectively.  The concept of political landscapes was 
developed and includes three core components: the institutional structure of the political 
system, the sociocultural context, and dynamic political opportunities.  Data was 
collected from 16 semi-structured interviews of LGBT SMO leaders.  Secondary data 
iv 
was also collected by examining public records, newspapers, magazines, and 
organizational websites.    
The results from this study suggest that dynamic political opportunities are 
embedded in the larger institutional and sociocultural contexts.  In Minnesota, the 
combination of a more open and competitive political system and a more diverse 
Christian presence and ethnically diverse urban areas have resulted in the use of tactics 
that are much more open and direct.  Specifically, LGBT SMOs in Minnesota use tactics 
such as only endorsing candidates publicly, focusing on building a broad bipartisan base 
of sponsors for LGBT legislation, working with other SMOs to create large coalitions, 
using a frame that is all-encompassing of movement goals, and building a large, 
grassroots movement.  By contrast, the closed and conservative political system and a 
dominant religion in Utah have resulted in more private, compromising, and behind-the-
scenes tactics.  LGBT SMOs in Utah tactics include using both public and private 
political endorsements, good-cop bad-cop organizations, delegate trainings, and frame 
alignment with the conservative culture.  
(96 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Effects of the Political Landscape on Social Movement  
Organization Tactical Choice 
 
by Jennifer Swalboski 
 
This thesis examines the tactics used by organizations in Minnesota and Utah pursuing 
rights and protections for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) 
community.  Minnesota and Utah provided good examples of LGBT movements that are 
pursuing moderate goals such as anti-discrimination or anti-bullying legislation.  
Minnesota movement organizations operate in a political context that offers a relative 
balance of political party power and diverse religious, racial and ethnic groups.  By 
contrast, Utah represents a very conservative political context in which Republicans have 
completely dominated both the legislative and executive branches for decades.  Utah also 
has a very monolithic culture which is dominated by one religion.  Both states have very 
different election systems and processes.  The differences in institutional (election 
systems), cultural, and political contexts led to the development of a concept called the 
“political landscape.”  Utah and Minnesota provided the basis for a comparative study of 
how the distinctive political landscapes of each state affect the tactics used by 
organizations.  Specifically, the research explored whether or not the conservative 
political landscape of Utah caused the LGBT organizations to create a different set of 
tactics compared to the more moderate and contested political landscape of Minnesota.  
 
The results of this study suggest that institutional factors (such as election and party 
systems) and cultural factors (such as religion and ethnic diversity) do structure the 
tactics LGBT leaders chose in pursuit of similar goals.  In Minnesota, the more open and 
competitive political landscape resulted in the use of tactics that are more open and 
direct.  Specifically, LGBT organizations in Minnesota used tactics such as endorsing 
candidates publicly, working with other organizations to create large coalitions, working 
toward all LGBT movement goals (such as marriage equality), and building a large, 
grassroots movement across the state. On the other hand, the closed and conservative 
political landscape of Utah resulted in more private, compromising, and behind-the-
scenes tactics. LGBT SMOs in Utah use both public and private political endorsements, 
targeted delegate trainings, and align their movement goals within terms that are 
compatible with the dominant conservative culture.  The conservative political landscape 
of Utah also caused tension within the LGBT movement because LGBT leaders were 
forced to compromise and carefully interact with conservative legislators who are not 
completely LGBT supportive, while simultaneously trying to assure the LGBT 
community of their commitment to all LGBT goals.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The “question of tactical choice is a persistent one for social movements. Tactics 
are the essence of collective action” (Ennis 1987: 520).  Much of the social movement 
research on tactics and strategies up until today has focused on conditions that promote 
the innovation of new forms of tactics and strategies (Brockett 1991; Gerlach and Hine 
1970; McAdam 1983; McCammon 2003; Staggenborg 1989; Tarrow 1994).  Other 
studies focus on how social movement organization (SMO) structure and internal 
characteristics are associated with the emergence of certain types of tactics and strategies 
(Freeman 1979; Morris 1984; Rupp and Taylor 1987; Staggenborg 1988, 1989).  Yet 
another avenue of research has explored how different types of tactics and strategies can 
contribute to SMO success or survival (Ganz 2000; Minkoff 1993; Taylor 2007).  
Although these avenues of research are important, relatively few have explored the roles 
of social, cultural, and political contexts in determining why social movement leaders 
choose certain tactics.   
Social movements are a major driver of social change in our society (McAdam 
and Snow 2010).  Some of the most studied social movements in the US include the 
Women’s Movement, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Peace Movement, each of 
which is known for using disruptive tactics during the earlier stages of each movement to 
accomplish their goals (McAdam 1983; McCammon 2003; Minkoff 1993; Staggenborg 
1988, 1989; Tarrow 1998).  Social movements such as these occurred during periods of 
great social change, which allowed for and sometimes demanded major tactical 
innovation to gain the attention needed for change to occur.  McAdam (1983) focuses on 
how the use of disruptive tactics by social movement actors can cause their opponents to 
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grant concessions in order to stop social disruption.  As social movements become more 
formal and institutionalized, they often shift their use of tactics and use fewer disruptive 
tactics (Freeman 1979; Morris 1984; Rupp and Taylor 1987; Staggenborg 1988).  The 
focus on the major US social movements during periods of great social change has 
resulted in a concentration of research studies on disruptive tactics, yet it is also 
important to understand the use of the full range of tactics by social movement 
organizations (SMO) that have become more formalized and institutionalized. 
One major focus of social movement activists over the last 20 years has been 
efforts to promote equality for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) citizens.  
The majority of social science research on the LGBT movement has focused on a small 
number of states where efforts to gain rights for same-sex marriage experienced 
prominent successes or failures (Knochel 2010; Lewis 2011; McCann 2011; Thomas 
2011; Willetts 2011).  While 11 states currently offer some form of relationship 
recognition to same-sex couples – whether it is marriage or civil unions – the bulk of US 
states have LGBT movement organizations whose efforts are directed toward different 
‘intermediate’ goals (short of marriage equality) to protect the rights of LGBT citizens 
(Human Rights Campaign 2011).   
In order to investigate why social movement leaders choose certain tactics, I 
conducted a comparative case study of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
SMOs in Utah and Minnesota.  Minnesota and Utah provide good examples of social 
movements whose work focuses on intermediate types of outcomes, including 
formalizing domestic partnership arrangements and passing local or statewide anti-
discrimination and anti-bullying statues.  They also are important cases to study because, 
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unlike many previous studies, these states provide more contested or unfavorable political 
landscapes which likely require SMOs to adapt their tactics and strategies to be effective.  
My specific research question is: How do the political landscapes of Utah and Minnesota 
affect the tactics and strategies that LGBT social movement organizations pursue as they 
seek to protect the rights and well-being of the LGBT community?   
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THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
Within social movement theory, three perspectives have been prominent: resource 
mobilization, political process model, and framing (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). 
These perspectives have each provided detailed explanations about the emergence and 
dynamics of social movements.  They have also each been adapted to explain the specific 
factors that account for the genesis of innovative SMO tactics, the relative effectiveness 
of different tactics for achieving movement goals, and the factors that are associated with 
the choice of certain tactics and strategies.  The following section provides the 
conceptualization of tactics and strategies, a brief overview of the contributions from 
each of these three social movement theoretical perspectives, and explores their potential 
application to an analysis of contextual influences on SMO strategies and tactics. 
 
Tactics & Strategies 
Previous work in social movement research often has been unsystematic in the 
use of the concepts of tactics and strategies.  In this research study, I am treating 
strategies as the long term action plans that define the broad approaches a social 
movement organization decides to follow to achieve a specific goal or result.  Previous 
research has identified four broad strategic forms that SMOs pursue: social protest, 
institutional advocacy, service provision, and cultural production or sponsorship 
(Minkoff 1993).  Social protest involves increasing visibility for movement issues and 
placing pressure on elites through the use of non-routine political action.  Social protest 
usually includes a public action that is demonstrative or confrontational in nature.  
Institutional advocacy involves seeking policy reforms through routine channels such as 
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conventional legal and political actions.  Service provision entails providing direct 
services or benefits to constituents without advocating any change in policy.  Finally, 
cultural production or sponsorship involves contributing to the distribution of ideas, 
knowledge, or systems of belief through action in arts, media, humanities, or social 
sciences.   
  Individual SMOs might primarily focus on one form, but can draw upon the full 
repertoire of strategic forms that might shift through time.  Preliminary research 
suggested that in both Minnesota and Utah statewide LGBT organizations focus 
primarily on institutional advocacy and service provision, but they differ in actual tactics 
to achieve their institutional goals.  For example, organizations in Minnesota and Utah 
may focus on the same strategy at different scales such as pursuing institutional change 
by affecting statewide legislation or by focusing on changes that can be effected at the 
local level in city councils, school districts, and counties. 
Given that LGBT organizations in Minnesota and Utah both mainly focus on 
institutional advocacy and service provision, I expected there to be variability in the 
tactics used by LGBT organizations located in different political landscapes.  Tactics are 
defined as the specific short- and medium-term methods used and employed in the 
greater social movement field by a SMO to achieve their strategic objectives and goals.  
Examples of tactics can include but are not limited to framing work, coalition or alliance 
building, organizational elaboration, community workshops, electoral mobilization 
strategies or insider tactics, and forms of protest (Ghoshal 2009; McAdams 1983; 
McCammon 2003; Morris 1981; Staggenborg 1989; Taylor 2007).  Forms of protest can 
include but are not limited to a march, sit-in, rally, or street theater.  These more 
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disruptive forms of tactics are less likely to be used by SMOs whose main strategies 
focus on institutional goals. 
 
Resource Mobilization 
Resource mobilization (RM) theory focuses on the significance of available social 
and material resources, as well as the organizational structure of social movement 
organizations.  Resources are considered to provide a foundation for the overall 
emergence, success, and development of social movement organizations (Zald, 1992).  
Successful fundraising has been found to be an important contributor to the innovation of 
SMO tactics (McCammon 2003), but the availability of a wide variety of resources, not 
just monetary, is also significant (Freeman 1983; McAdam 1983). Within the RM 
perspective, the structure of a larger community of contemporaneous social movements is 
thought to affect the emergence, resources, outcomes, tactics, and strategies of particular 
SMOs.  Research studies have found that heterogeneous social movement fields, or 
organizations with diverse visions of how leaders should achieve their goals, are more 
likely to have substantial discussion or debate of the appropriate tactics than a field 
without SMO diversity.  Therefore, discussion and debate among leaders of a 
heterogeneous social movement field are more likely to spur the development of new 
tactics (Ganz 2000; McCammon 2003).   
The organizational structure of SMOs has been found to be an important factor in 
the use of different types of tactics and strategies (Freeman 1979, Morris 1981, 1984; 
Staggenborg 1988, 1989).  SMOs that are more centralized and formalized are expected 
to select more institutionalized and non-disruptive tactics and strategies.  By contrast, the 
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more decentralized and less formalized SMOs tend to be more engaged in direct-action 
and disruptive tactics.   
 
Political Process  
 The availability of resources, organizational structure, and the broader SMO field 
all influence the innovation of new tactics and the type of tactics used, but this does not 
address the influence of larger societal context on tactical choices.  The political process 
model builds on and extends the resource mobilization perspective.  Political process 
scholars recognize the importance of resources in social movement success, but assert 
that even when a movement has a great number of resources, if there is an unfavorable 
institutional context or a lack of political opportunities, the movement will not be 
successful.   
Political opportunities can be understood as, “consistent – but not necessarily 
formal or permanent – dimensions of the political struggle that encourage or discourage 
people from using collective action” (Tarrow 1998:18).  This definition allows for a 
broad interpretation of political opportunities so clarification is needed.  The following 
makes a distinction between structural and dynamic political opportunities.   
“Structural opportunities are [the] more stable features of political institutions and 
culture that change only gradually over decades” (Jenkins and Form 2005: 338).  
Institutional political arrangements (e.g., party systems, voting rules, balance of power 
between the executive, judiciary and legislative branches) that are more diverse, open, 
and/or responsive to civil society are easier for SMOs to influence than monolithic, 
closed, or repressive systems.  
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Scholars have found that the institutional structure of a political system shapes the 
differences in movement formation and strategy (Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 
1991; Meyer 1993).  Specifically, national differences in state institutions (Eisinger 1973; 
Kitschelt 1986; Meyer 1993) and political party systems (Kriesi 1991) provide stable 
opportunities, or a structured context, that shape differences in movement formation and 
strategy.  Greater institutional access to political decision makers generally has been 
found to make social movement actors less likely to turn to disruptive tactics (Kitschelt 
1986).  These systematic institutional contexts are more enduring than the constantly 
changing dynamic political opportunities.   
The institutional structure of Minnesota and Utah’s political systems may have a 
significant effect on tactical choice.  An open political structure with primary elections 
and two competing political parties (as in MN) may lead SMOs leaders to make different 
choices compared to a more closed political structure with a caucus system and one 
dominant political party (as in UT).     
There is also a strong cultural component when understanding structural 
opportunities.  While not ignoring the institutional component of structural opportunities, 
some studies focus on the influence of cultural components such as political culture, 
political discourse, and the prevailing cultural climate.  For instance, different political 
cultures in Germany and France changed the way activists thought about politics (Nelkin 
and Pollack 1981).  Brand (1990) focused on how the prevailing cultural climate affects 
and interacts with framing activities.  Related factors such as religion, ethnic diversity, 
and public opinion may be important in understanding SMO leaders’ tactical and 
strategic choices.   
9 
A second type of political opportunity reflects ‘dynamic’ political opportunities 
that are “relatively volatile, shifting with events, polices and political actors” (Gamson 
and Meyer 1996: 277).  These kinds of political opportunities reflect shorter-term 
variation through time in the degree of SMO access to the political system, divisions 
within the political elite, availability of elite allies, and the degree of state repression 
(McAdam 1996).  Historical conjunctures might provide constellations of factors that are 
relatively favorable (or unfavorable) to the ability of the SMO to impact political 
outcomes.  It is important to understand that “In this more dynamic model of political 
opportunity, structure channels movement activities, making various choices of action 
appear more or less desirable…” (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 278). 
Within social movement research, a number of dimensions of dynamic political 
opportunities have been shown to affect the development of movement tactics.  
Perceptions of political opportunities by social movement leaders can spur tactical 
innovation (McAdam 1983) and more specifically periods of political conflict and 
instability - characterized by greater fragmentation among elites or increased competition 
among elites due to political realignments - can alter the use of different tactics (Brockett 
1991; Tarrow 1998).  Institutionalized state structures create stable patterns of access, but 
changing political opportunities such as an opening up of access to power, shifts in ruling 
alignments, cleavages among elites, and the availability of influential allies provide 
incentives for leaders to develop or change tactics in order to take advantage of the 
political opportunity.   McCammon (2003) found that political defeats in the larger 
political environment, rather than perceived political opportunities, can cause social 
movement actors to change tactics.   
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In general, more favorable political opportunities would be expected to be found 
in Minnesota given their more open institutional structure and contested political 
landscape.  A greater diversity of political actors and interests suggest that SMO leaders 
in Minnesota are likely to have more potential elite allies which would increase their 
perceived political opportunities.  This could manifest tactically as increased coalition 
building and more overt pressure on elected officials especially at the state-level 
compared to Utah.  On the other hand, incremental changes at the municipal level for 
Utah may be more prevalent as a result of their more closed institutional structure and 
lack of political opportunities.  These conditions may also lead to the use of disruptive 
tactics in Utah.   
 
Framing 
A major critique of resource mobilization theory and the political process model 
is that they do not adequately account for how people experience and understand their 
social world, and for the central role of cultural beliefs, interpretative frames and idea 
systems in making sense of social phenomena (Klandermans 1992).  Snow and Benford 
(1992) argue that effective social movements actively engage in the production and 
maintenance of meaning.  They do this by framing, which is the “signifying work, that is 
the processes associated with assigning meaning to or interpreting relevant events and 
conditions in ways intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner 
bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists” (Benford 1997: 416).  SMOs both 
respond to larger interpretive frames in society as they select tactics that will resonate 
with their followers and broader society, but also use framing as a tactic to help shift 
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public perceptions and support in their favor.  Specifically, SMOs operate under a 
broader collective action frame which involves “public discourse, that is, the interface of 
media discourse and interpersonal interaction; persuasive communication during 
mobilization campaigns by movement organizations, their opponents and 
countermovement organizations; and consciousness raising during episodes of collection 
actions” (Klandermans 1997: 45). 
These broader collective action frames shape the tactics that SMOs use 
(Staggenborg 1989), but SMOs also frequently try and reshape or redefine the collective 
action frames they operate under as a tactic itself.  As SMOs try to reshape the collective 
action frame, they do so in response to the broader political environment (Benford and 
Snow 2000).  Therefore, the use of framing as a tactic and collective action frames are 
important cultural factors in understanding why SMO leaders choose certain tactics.    
 
Political Landscapes 
The field of social movement research on tactics and strategies is broad and 
covers many possible explanations of tactical innovation and change.  SMO institutional 
resources, political processes, and framing are all potentially important influences on 
their choices of tactics. In this study, the concepts of structural – both institutional and 
cultural – and dynamic political opportunities are used to develop the idea of a ‘political 
landscape’ that I expect to structure the selection of movement tactics by LGBT SMOs in 
Utah and Minnesota.  There is a relative lack of research on how structural opportunities 
affect tactical choice and types of tactics.  It is important to understand how the 
institutional structure of a state’s political system may affect tactical choice.  I would also 
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like to further develop the idea of a cultural component of structural opportunities by 
looking at variables such as religion, ethnic diversity, and public opinion on LGBT issues 
as the sociocultural context.   
There is an underlying assumption in this study that social movements geared at 
institutional change will need many types of resources. Because I want to highlight the 
influence of the different political landscapes in Utah and Minnesota, I focused my 
research on aspects of political opportunities and sociocultural factors that affect tactical 
choices rather than features of resource mobilization and framing theories.  The greater 
institutional and cultural contexts have been conceptualized as the more stable 
characteristics of a state that may influence resource mobilization, dynamic political 
opportunities, and framing as well as tactics and strategies (Figure 1).  Dynamic political 
opportunities are included in this study to further understand the specific impacts of 
shifting short-term political opportunities on tactical choices.     
Political landscapes in my study include three core components:  the institutional 
structure of the political system, the sociocultural context of each state, and dynamic 
political opportunities.  The institutional structure of the political system refers to the 
specific enduring characteristics of each state’s political system, including whether it has 
a competitive two-party or one-party dominated system and the type of election 
procedures used to elect local and state political officials.  The sociocultural context 
refers to how sociocultural characteristics, including religious tendencies, ethnic 
diversity, and public opinion, are likely to shape greater collective action frames and 
affect the use of certain movement tactics.  This study will use McAdam’s (1996) 
definition of (dynamic) political opportunities which includes the degree of access to the 
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political system, existence of divisions within the elite, availability of elite allies, and 
degree of state repression.   
 
 
FIGURE 1. Components of the Political Landscape in Relation to Social Movement 
Theory 
Note: Political Landscape components denoted by a gray background. 
 
My research question is: How does the political landscape of Utah and Minnesota 
affect the tactics and strategies that LGBT social movement organizations pursue as they 
seek to protect the rights and well-being of the LGBT community?  Within this broader 
question, I want to explore two focused subquestions: (a) Are there certain parts of the 
political landscape that have more influence on SMO choices of tactics and strategies? 
and (b) Is there a distinctive set of tactics adopted by SMOs working in more closed or 
conservative political landscapes? 
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METHODS 
 
Data Collection 
This is a comparative analysis of social movement organizations in Minnesota 
and Utah.  The unit of analysis is statewide social movement organizations who are 
pursuing institutional changes to increase the rights and well-being of each state’s LBGT 
residents.  Purposive, theory-based sampling was used to select social movement 
organizations in Utah and in Minnesota (Patton 2002).  As mentioned above, examples of 
strategies used in social movement research include: social protest, institutional 
advocacy, service provision, and cultural production or sponsorship (Minkoff 1993).  
Purposive sampling was used to select all SMOs in each state that place some emphasis 
on advocating for policies and programs to benefit the LGBT community.  Three 
organizations in Minnesota and two organizations in Utah were identified as LGBT 
SMOs that pursue institutional advocacy, the selection criteria.  Most of these also were 
engaged in service provision and/or cultural production.   
 I started by collecting secondary data and examining public and archival records 
to provide descriptive data on each state’s political landscape and social movement 
organizations.  Table 1 provides an overview of how various types of data were used in 
relation to the sections in this paper.  SMO websites were used to do a preliminary 
analysis of organizations.  Mainstream newspapers were systematically searched using 
words related to the LGBT movement and LGBT organizations.  The accuracy of the 
organization’s websites and media sources were checked during key informant 
interviews.  LGBT magazines were searched to provide additional information about the 
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LGBT communities and movements in Utah and Minnesota.  Government websites were 
used to find information about legislation related to the LGBT movement.  All of these 
sources of data provided a basis for detailed questions during key informant interviews.  
Census data, public records, and media archives were used to characterize the political 
landscape of each state.  
  
TABLE 1. Sources of Data Used in Operationalizing Key Concepts 
 
Key Concept 
 
Data Source 
Institutional 
Structure 
MN & UT State Legislature Websites 
Minnesota Historical Society 
Utah Foundation 
Utah Priorities Survey 
Sociocultural 
Context 
U.S. Religious Landscape Survey 
U.S. Bureau of Census 
Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and Policy Responsiveness 
Newspaper Articles 
Dynamic Political 
Opportunities 
MN & UT State Legislature Websites 
Minnesota Historical Society 
State of Utah Websites 
LGBT Organization Websites 
Movement History LGBT Organization Websites 
MN & UT State Legislature Websites 
Primary Interviews with SMO leaders 
Newspaper Articles 
Impacts of Political 
Landscape 
LGBT Organization Websites 
MN & UT State Legislature Websites 
Primary Interviews with SMO leaders 
Newspaper Articles 
LGBT Magazine Articles 
 
 
Primary data was collected from semi-structured interviews of leaders of LGBT 
SMOs in Utah and Minnesota.  Raw data was gathered from leaders who are “the people 
authorized to make strategic choices within an organization” (Ganz 2000).  I also 
recognize that individual leaders rarely act alone, but formulate tactics and strategies 
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through a process of interaction between the many leaders who share responsibilities in 
an organization.  Therefore, I conducted interviews with all willing decision makers in 
the organizations.  Leaders ranged from executive directors to community organizers in 
each of my study organizations.   
The interview instrument included questions about the informant’s involvement in 
the LGBT movement; the use and change of tactics and strategies; how political, 
institutional, and cultural factors influenced tactics and strategies; and how financial and 
human resources affected tactics and strategies.  The majority of interviews ranged from 
45 minutes to 90 minutes; three interviews last longer than two hours.  As the 
interviewer, I acknowledged that I had previously volunteered for an LGBT organization 
in most interviews.  I believe that my involvement in the LGBT community influenced 
and increased the responses by those interviewed.    
Utah has roughly half as many residents as Minnesota.  Compared to Minnesota, 
Utah has a notably smaller number of organizations and individuals working towards 
institutional advocacy for LGBT rights, so snowball sampling was also used to identify 
more key informants.  Interview respondents were asked to suggest the names of others 
who they thought would be good sources of information about political action on behalf 
of the LGBT community.  This led to interviews with two LGBT SMO founders and past 
board members.  A third interview was conducted with an SMO employee who had 
separate responsibilities in the larger LGBT movement outside of their organization 
responsibilities.   
 Nine interviews were conducted in Utah with seven leaders at two social 
movement organizations.  Follow-up interviews were conducted with two informants.  
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There were no problems contacting and conducting interviews with LGBT leaders in 
Utah (other than the fact that there is a relatively small number of leaders).  Informants 
were willing and happy to help with the study and tell their story of Utah’s LGBT 
movement.   
 Seven interviews were conducted with SMO leaders in Minnesota.  The leaders 
came from three social movement organizations that have been working for years to 
affect institutional change that would expand LGBT rights in the state.   All of the longest 
serving and most experienced LGBT leaders in Minnesota were interviewed, but some of 
the newer, more active political organizers declined to be interviewed.  This allowed for a 
detailed understanding of the last decade of the LGBT movement in Minnesota, but I was 
unable to gather full information about some of the most recent tactical choices in policy 
and political decision making.  Specifically, I was denied access to leaders and staff who 
are working on a newly created political campaign to defeat a proposed constitutional 
amendment to ban same-sex marriage that will be voted on in a statewide referendum in 
November 2012.  An initial meeting and short interview was conducted with a campaign 
organizer, but they declined to participate in a full interview afterwards.  Other 
informants pointed to another campaign organizer, but this person also declined to be 
interviewed.  Two leaders from another organization also declined to be interviewed.  All 
of these potential respondents said they did not have enough time to be interviewed.  
After a short interview with someone from a different organization, the interviewee 
decided she was not the right person to speak with.  Problems with interviewing key 
informants were only found in Minnesota.  It took a substantially longer amount of time 
to start a dialogue with key informants in Minnesota than it did in Utah.    
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Data Analysis 
 I used public records and archives to operationalize the three components of 
political landscape.   This information was used to help guide interview questions and 
develop a broader understanding of the relationships between political landscapes and the 
strategies and tactics of LGBT social movement organizations in each state.   
All interviews were transcribed and combined with all other types of data to 
explore patterns and relationships among the key variables.  First, the transcripts of the 
interviews were analyzed by using open coding, which involved categorizing interviews 
by words and phrases that identify specific dimensions (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995). 
General themes were found on most aspects of the political landscape, tactics, and 
strategies.  The second step of analysis included focused coding where specific themes 
found during transcription and the first round of open coding were elaborated on and 
validated.  The last round of coding focused on the apparent linkages between 
components of the political landscape and the use of certain tactics or strategies.   
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of Research Design  
In this research study, it is difficult to understand the exact impact each state’s 
political landscape has on SMO tactical choices because the sample size is small.  There 
may also be unmeasured variables that differentiate Utah and Minnesota which could be 
involved in determining tactical choices.  Although the exact impact of the political 
landscape may be difficult to prove, this study identifies some important patterns based 
on secondary data and the accounts of leaders in LGBT statewide social movements and 
the narratives behind why leaders chose certain tactics and strategies.  Although the 
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findings of this study should not be generalized to all other types of social movements, 
the findings may be generalizable to other U.S. states that have similar political 
landscapes and to SMOs with similar goals.  Further research may be conducted 
comparing other conservative states, such as states in the South, with Utah to see if their 
political landscapes produce the similar forms of tactics and strategies.   
 
Ethical Considerations 
A letter of information was given to each key informant describing the research 
study and possible breaches of confidentiality.  Since each social movement has only a 
small number of organizations, it is difficult to disguise the identity of my informants.  
To avoid this, some details are blurred whenever there are specific comments that may 
lead to the discovery of the respondent or when the information could harm the 
respondent and/or organization.  Extra attention is taken to avoid the release of any 
confidential information through the use of quotations.   
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DESCRIPTION OF STUDY AREAS 
 
 
Political Landscapes 
My research explores how the political landscape of Minnesota and Utah can help 
explain the tactics and strategies chosen by social movement organizations in those 
states.  As discussed above, I define political landscape as having three key features: 
institutional structures, sociocultural contexts, and dynamic political opportunities.   
To characterize the institutional political opportunities in each state, the party 
configuration of the legislature and Governor’s office was analyzed over the last two 
decades for Minnesota and Utah.  The relative balance or unbalance of power and 
internal workings of the major political parties are also important to understand elements 
of the institutional structure for each state. The institutional structure of each state’s 
political system is represented by the processes of local and state election systems.   
 
Institutional Structure of State Politics 
 For the Minnesota State Legislature and Governor’s office, there is an open 
primary election system for major political parties (Table 2).  Party caucuses elect 
delegates who vote for the party endorsement, which is the selection of their favorite 
candidate, but a candidate must win the primary election to win the actual party 
nomination.  At the primary election, every citizen eligible to vote, regardless of party 
affiliation, may participate in the primary election to determine the party nominee.  Once 
a candidate wins the party nomination, they will appear on the ballot for the general 
election.   
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   Minnesota’s political institutional context has been remarkably balanced and 
hotly contested for several decades (Figure 2).  There are three major political parties in 
Minnesota: The Republican Party, The Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party (DFL), and the 
Independence Party (Table 2).  The Independence Party had some influence in the late 
1990s and the early 21
st
 century with one elected governor and one elected state senator.  
Other than that, the DFL and the Republican Party are the major political parties in 
Minnesota.  The last three governors in Minnesota have been from all three major 
political parties.  Over the last decade, there has not been a time period where one 
political party was in control of both the legislative and executive branches.   
 
TABLE 2. Institutional Structure of Minnesota and Utah’s Political Systems 
 
Component of  
Political Landscape 
 
Minnesota 
 
Utah 
Local & State Elections Open Primary Election Caucus System 
Major Political Parties Democratic-Farm-Labor Party 
Republican Party of Minnesota 
Independence Party of Minnesota 
Republican Party of Utah 
Democratic Party of Utah 
Sources: Minnesota Secretary of State 2012b, and the Utah Foundation 2011 
 
 
Utah uses a caucus system to nominate candidates for elected office.  Candidates 
for partisan races, which include local, county, and state level offices, are elected by 
delegates selected to represent voters in Utah (Table 2).  Delegates are elected at precinct 
caucuses to attend county and state conventions.  Delegates vote to decide which 
candidate will be on the ballot for the general election.  If a candidate does not receive 
60% of delegate votes, then two candidates are placed on a primary election in June 
where voters can choose who will be on the ballot for the general election.  Republican 
caucuses and primaries are closed which means that only registered Republicans can vote 
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in them.  On the other hand, Democratic caucuses and primaries are open which means 
that registered Democrats and unaffiliated voters can vote in the Democratic primary.   
 
 
FIGURE 2. Political Party Control of Minnesota’s Legislature, 1989-2012 
Source: Minnesota State Legislature 2012 
 
 Utah’s political system over the last two decades reflects a more conservative 
political culture than Minnesota.  There are two major political parties in Utah: the Utah 
Republican Party and the Utah Democratic Party.  These two political parties have 
dominated Utah politics over the last couple decades.  Third parties have not won any 
seats in the legislature in the last decade.   
The Republican Party has a very large majority in both the Senate (22-7) and the 
House of Representatives (58-17) (Utah State Legislature 2012).  A Republican majority 
has been a constant over the last decade for both the Senate and House of Representatives 
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in Utah (Figure 3).  There have been no legislators from any other political party besides 
the Republican Party and the Democratic Party in this time period.   
 The same is true for the Governor’s office in Utah.  The current Governor, Gary 
Herbert, is a Republican (Minnesota’s Historical Society 2012).  Over the last 27 years, 
every governor in Utah has been a Republican.  The last couple of decades of Utah 
Governors and the State Legislature illustrates that state politics are overwhelmingly 
dominated by Republicans.  Republicans have had a steadily growing majority in the 
House of Representatives over the last couple decades (Figure 3).     
 
 
FIGURE 3. Political Party Control of Utah’s Legislature, 1988-2011 
Source: Utah State Legislature 2012 
 
 
The Republican Party has been criticized in recent years because Republican 
delegates to state party conventions do not represent political views the Republican 
voters.  Surveys conducted in 2010 and 2012 compared the political ideologies of Utah 
party delegates and the larger electorate (Utah Foundation 2012).  In 2010, there were 
distinct differences between Republican voters and delegates with the delegates taking 
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more extreme positions than voters.  A similar survey conducted in 2012 found that both 
the Republican voters and delegates have become more moderate, though the gap 
between their views persisted (Figure 4).  The study noted that increased turnout at party 
caucus meetings in 2012 likely explained the moderation in state delegate ideologies.  
Although there is not as pronounced a difference in 2012, 61% of Republican delegates 
identify as Conservative whereas only 51% of Republican voters do.   
  
FIGURE 4. Political Ideology of Delegates and Voters, 2012 
Source: The 2012 Utah Priorities Survey of Party Delegates and Voters (Utah Foundation 2012) 
 
 
Utah’s LogCabin Republicans, the LGBT caucus in the national Republican 
Party, are not recognized as an official caucus by the Utah Republican Party.  The 
Stonewall Democrats, the LGBT caucus in the national Democratic Party, is the largest 
caucus for the Utah Democratic Party.   
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Sociocultural Context 
 As stated earlier, the sociocultural context involves looking at how specific 
sociocultural characteristics of each state, specifically religious tendencies and ethnic 
diversity, are likely to shape the use of certain movement tactics.  Understanding the 
religious and ethnic composition of Minnesota and Utah highlights the possible factors 
that may affect the LGBT movements in each state. 
 There is a significant but diverse Christian presence in Minnesota that consists of 
roughly equal proportions of Mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Evangelical Protestants 
(Table 3).  Most religions comprising less than one percent of the population were left out 
of Table 3 except for Mormons to allow comparison with Utah.  Minnesota is 
overwhelmingly Protestant and Catholic.   
 
TABLE 3.  Religious Affiliation for Minnesota & Utah, 2008 
 
Religious Affiliation Minnesota Utah U.S. Average  
Catholic 28 10 24 
Evangelical Protestant 21 7 26 
Mainline Protestant 32 6 18 
Mormon <0.5 58 2 
Unaffiliated  13 16 16 
Other 6 3 14 
Total 100 100 100 
Source:  2008 U.S. Religious Landscape Survey (The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life) 
Notes:  *All percentages are rounded to the nearest percent. 
** Representative sample of over 35,000 adults in the U.S.  
 
 
 Minnesota has less ethnic diversity than the US as a whole, with a higher 
percentage of people who classify themselves as Non-Hispanic White (Table 4).  
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Minnesota also has a smaller percentage of Blacks and Hispanics than the national 
average, but is very similar with its Asian population.  Minnesota does have a more 
diverse population in the major urban areas, but northern and rural Minnesota have very 
homogenous populations, which can be found in statewide totals.   
 
TABLE 4. Percentages of Ethnic Diversity in Minnesota & Utah, 2010 
 
Ethnicity Minneapolis/ 
St. Paul 
Minnesota Salt Lake 
City 
Utah U.S. Average  
American Indian 
or Alaska Native  
1 1 1 1 1 
Asian 10 4 4 2 5 
Non-Hispanic 
Black 
17 5 3 1 12 
Hispanic 10 5 22 13 16 
Native Hawaiian 
or other Pacific 
Islander 
<.05 <.05 2 1 0 
Non-Hispanic 
White 
58 83 66 80 64 
Other <.5 <.5 <.5 <.5 <.5 
Two or More 
Races 
3 2 2 2 2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 2010a & b 
Notes: *All percentages are rounded to the nearest percent.  
**Data is a combination of race and ethnicity. 
 
 The vast majority of Utah residents belong to a single church: The Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS) (also known as the Mormons).  The next largest 
group would be those who identified as unaffiliated with any religious group or belief.  
Only 23% of Utahns are either Catholic or Protestant.   
Similar to Minnesota, a large part of the population in Utah (80%) identifies as 
Non-Hispanic White (Table 4).  Hispanics are the next largest ethnic group in Utah 
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comprising 13% of the population.  Although some ethnic group percentages do increase 
in Salt Lake City, it is still much less diverse than the Twin Cities (Minneapolis and St. 
Paul).  All other ethnic groups are 1-2% or less of the population of Utah.  Compared to 
Minnesota, Utah is somewhat less ethnically and much less religiously diverse.   
 Table 5 presents results of public opinion polls in Minnesota and Utah that show 
support for a range of pro-gay policies.  The results suggest that the public is much more 
supportive of LGBT rights in Minnesota than Utah.  Minnesota’s public is actually more 
supportive of LBGT policies than the national average, whereas Utah’s residents are 
notably less supportive of LGBT issues. 
  
TABLE 5. Percentage of People Who Support Pro-Gay Policies in Minnesota, Utah, and 
the United States 
 
State Housing Hate 
Crimes 
Health 
Benefits 
2
nd
 Parent 
Adoption 
Civil 
Unions 
Marriage Average 
Minnesota 78 74 60 47 51 42 59 
Utah 57 55 41 22 38 25 40 
U.S. 75 70 59 43 49 39 56 
Source:  Lax and Phillips 2009 
Notes: All averages are rounded.  
 
 
 Interestingly, The Advocate, the oldest continuing LGBT publication in the United 
States, has ranked the largest cities in both Minnesota and Utah at different times as the 
gayest city in the U.S.   In 2011, Minneapolis was voted the gayest city in the U.S. and it 
was followed by Salt Lake City earning the title of gayest city in the U.S. for 2012 (Breen 
2012).  These ratings are based off of number of variables including LGBT elected city 
officials, LGBT bookstores, Transgender protections and some entertainment variables.  
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Dynamic Political Opportunities 
 I also was attentive to information from my informants about key shifts in 
political alignments that affected their tactical choices.  Minnesota’s current legislature is 
controlled by Republicans, but this is the first entirely Republican legislature since 1974 
(Minnesota State Legislature 2012).  The Democratic Party controlled the previous two 
legislatures from 2007-2010, which provided higher levels of political access to the 
legislature and more political allies.   
As in table 6, the current governor of Minnesota, Governor Dayton, is a 
Democrat.  Governor Dayton’s election to office presented an important dynamic 
political opportunity because he has been found to be very LGBT friendly.  Former 
Governor Pawlenty of the Republican Party held the office from 2003-2011.   
 
TABLE 6. Party Control of Minnesota and Utah’s Current Legislative & Executive 
Branches 
Component of  
Political Landscape 
 
Minnesota 
 
Utah 
House of 
Representatives 
72-63 Republican 58-17 Republican 
Senate 37-30 Republican 22-7 Republican 
Current Governor Democratic Republican 
Sources: Minnesota Legislature 2012, Utah State Legislature 2012, Minnesota Historical Society 2012, the 
State of Utah 2012 
 
 Other than political opportunities involved with alignment changes, Minnesota 
has also experienced two political opportunities involving possible policy changes.   
From 2004 to 2006, legislators unsuccessfully tried to put an amendment to ban same-sex 
marriage on the ballot.  In 2011, the legislature successfully put an amendment to ban 
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same-sex marriage on the 2012 ballot.  These two political opportunities manifested as 
possible policy changes that would affect the LGBT movement.  These are discussed in 
more detail below. 
 Dynamic political opportunities in Utah are related to particular events and the 
broader conservative political system and culture, not shifts in political power between 
the parties.  As will be explained later, the involvement of the LDS Church in Californian 
politics (Proposition 8) created an opportunity for Utah SMOs to work with church 
leaders.  Pro-LGBT political actions in the more urban and Democratic capital city (Salt 
Lake City) shifted the tenor of political coalitions in the Republican dominated legislature 
and prompted short-term shifts in LGBT tactics.  In general, dynamic political 
opportunities, or the degree of “absence” of political opportunities, in Utah reflect the 
dominant conservative political system and culture.   
 
LGBT Activism in Minnesota 
The formalization of the LGBT movement in Minnesota began in 1987 when 
local Minneapolis leaders started the Gay and Lesbian Community Action Council 
(GLCAC).  In its beginning, the GLCAC offered direct services such as a crime victim 
services and referrals for many kinds of professional services.  The 1990’s brought a shift 
in focus for the organization from service-oriented to public policy work.  The Gay and 
Lesbian Community Action Council changed its name to a more inclusive OutFront 
Minnesota and started to focus on advocacy for changes in state and local policies.  
OutFront Minnesota launched the It’s Time Campaign in 1992 which lead to the passage 
of an amendment to the Minnesota Human Rights Act in 1993.  The amendment bans 
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discrimination against LGBT people in areas such as education, employment, public 
services, and public accommodation (OutFront Minnesota 2012b). 
OutFront Minnesota hired their first statewide organizer in 1998 and he 
immediately started to receive phone calls from around the state.  This led to trainings, 
education, and community organizing in over ten cities all around Minnesota (OutFront 
Minnesota 2012a).   
The next decade brought new challenges and a very big focus on institutional 
policy reforms for OutFront Minnesota.  They joined the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union 
in a successful challenge of the state’s sodomy laws in 2001.  Although OutFront 
Minnesota had been focusing on public policy and organizing for almost a decade, they 
did not hire their first public policy director until 2001.  This coincided with the 
development of a lobbying and political organizing arm of the organization.   
The LGBT movement became more organized in Minnesota than it ever had been 
but it needed this strength because opponents began a legislative assault to roll back 
LGBT-friendly policies in the early 2000s.  In 2003, OutFront Minnesota began spending 
much of their time preventing legislation from being passed that was harmful to the 
interests of the LGBT community.  They successfully defeated efforts to repeal the 
human rights protections won in 1993.  In 2004, conservative state legislators started a 
two year battle to amend Minnesota’s constitution to prevent same-sex marriage.  
OutFront Minnesota played a key role in preventing the proposed anti-marriage 
amendment from going to the voters.  They did this by increasing attendance at their 
annual LGBT lobby day at the capitol from around 200 people in 2002 to over 5,000 
people in 2006.   
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OutFront Minnesota also incorporated a political action committee (PAC) in 
2004.  This allowed OutFront Minnesota to help elect more pro-LGBT political leaders in 
the 2006 elections (OutFront Minnesota 2012a).   
In 2007, OutFront Minnesota went through major organizational changes.  They 
lost important sources of funding because some key financial backers wanted to fund 
other causes.  The longtime executive director and LGBT movement leader left the 
organization.  The loss of funding caused the organization to go from 15 fulltime staff to 
only seven or eight over the next year.   
The movement also saw the rise of two new organizations in the LGBT 
movement in 2008.  Project 515 was created as a ’grass-tops’ organization in response to 
research that identified 515 state statues that discriminated against same-sex couples.  
The organization was created to specifically do policy and lobbying work to change these 
515 statues.  Project 515 does work with OutFront Minnesota on policy issues, but does 
not get involved with organizing and leadership development across the state.   
Meanwhile, a local non-political service organization, Rainbow Families, merged with a 
national policy organization called the Family Equality Council.  This merge created a 
Midwest Regional office for Family Equality Council. Minnesota Family Equality 
Council mainly acts as a support group and educational group for LGBT families, but 
works with Outfront Minnesota on policy related to families and children.   
During Governor Pawlenty’s time in office from 2003 to 2011, several important 
pro-LGBT bills – including legislation to create statewide Domestic Partner Benefits, the 
Safe Schools for All Bill which addresses anti-bullying, and a Final Wishes/Wrongful 
Death bill that gave same-sex partners basic end-of-life rights – were all passed by the 
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Democratic majorities in the state legislature with occasional bipartisan support.  
However, all of these bills were vetoed by Governor Pawlenty.   
The Safe Schools for All Bill is a particularly good example of a bill that has been 
proposed many times but has yet to receive support from both the state legislature and 
governor.  The bill would add protections under current harassment and bullying law for 
students with “disabilities, immigrant students, students who identify as LGBT or have 
LGBT parents, or who have certain physical characteristics who are at a higher risk of 
being bullied at school” (Minnesota Safe Schools for All 2012).  In 2009, Governor 
Pawlenty told Republicans that he would sign the Safe Schools for All Bill into law and 
the bill passed with bipartisan support from the legislature.  Nevertheless, Governor 
Pawlenty still vetoed the bill.  Many LGBT leaders associated this with his desire to run 
for President in 2012, so he could not be seen soft on LGBT issues. 
In 2007, OutFront Minnesota helped Duluth and St. Paul to become the second 
and third cities in Minnesota respectively to enact a municipal Domestic Partner Registry.  
The Domestic Partner Registry allows same-sex and opposite-sex couples to register as a 
couple.  This strengthens a couple’s ability to secure benefits or protections voluntarily 
provided by businesses, hospitals, or other entities.  Although they helped the first few 
cities pass Domestic Partner Registries, OutFront Minnesota never took their focus from 
state-level advocacy work.  Nevertheless, there are now 18 cities in Minnesota that allow 
Domestic Partner Registries, though most actively started this move on their own without 
the involvement of OutFront Minnesota.   
In 2010, there was a major shift in the control of the legislature and governor’s 
office by political parties.  Specifically, the Minnesota Legislature had a huge Democratic 
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majority in 2009-2010 with 87 Democrats and 47 Republicans (Minnesota Senate 2012; 
Minnesota House of Representatives 2012).  The 2010 elections resulted in a complete 
turnaround, with a new Republican majority (72 Republicans and 62 Democrats). 
Meanwhile, Governor Pawlenty, a two-term Republican from 2003-2011, was not 
supportive of the LGBT movement.  He decided to run for President in 2012, so he did 
not run for a third term as governor.  The governor’s race in 2010 was hotly contested 
and resulted in Governor Dayton, a Democrat, winning.  Governor Dayton has proven to 
be one of the most pro-LGBT governors in Minnesota’s history.  He is the first sitting 
governor to speak at the LGBT lobby day.   
The switch of party control of the Minnesota Legislature and Governor’s Office 
changed the political landscape and provided positive and negative political opportunities 
for LGBT SMOs in the state.  For example, in 2011, the newly won Republican majority 
in the state legislature voted to put an amendment to Minnesota’s constitution on the 
2012 ballot.  The amendment would ban same-sex marriage.  OutFront Minnesota and 
Project 515 have campaigned against the amendment by organizing a coalition of SMOs 
called Minnesota United for All Families.  The campaign now has over 26 staff members 
and over 300 organizations have joined together to fight the amendment (Minnesotans 
United for All Families 2012).  The amendment has also attracted attention and support 
from national LGBT organizations as well as conservative anti-LGBT groups.  This has 
provided OutFront Minnesota with new resources to increase their staff and programming 
in preparation for the amendment vote this fall. 
The reaction to the amendment against same-sex marriage has created a stronger 
LGBT movement.  The LGBT organizations now have more resources than they have 
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had before and are intent on building on the foundations they have spent almost two 
decades creating.  They have increased efforts to build local groups and leaders all 
around the state and have created a massive coalition of cities, businesses, non-profits, 
churches, and individuals in support of same-sex marriage and against the amendment.   
 
LGBT Activism in Utah 
 The LGBT movement in Utah started as a much more community-oriented 
movement compared to Minnesota.  The Utah Stonewall Center started as a community 
center in 1992 and attracted many volunteers.  After financial difficulties, the Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer (LGBTQ) Community Center of Utah, was 
created upon the remnants the Utah Stonewall Center in 1997.  Neighboring buildings 
were bought so that the center could become the permanent home for the LGBT 
community in Salt Lake City. The LGBTQ Community Center of Utah would later be 
renamed the Utah Pride Center.  The Utah Pride Center took over the financial 
responsibilities of the Utah Pride Festival in 2001, making it unique compared to many 
Pride Festivals around the country because it was run by an actual LGBT organization.    
 Founders of the Utah Pride Center recognized the need to better organize the 
political power of the LGBT community in Salt Lake City.  For a while, there was only a 
phone tree of LGBT people in Salt Lake City to call for political action and LGBT 
leaders realized that there was more potential for organized political action.  In 2001, 
Equality Utah was created and incorporated as a political action committee, which allows 
the organization to endorse political candidates.  The organization focused on electing 
city-level LGBT candidates and building membership and funds.    
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 In 2004, with the full backing of the legislature and governor, Utah voters 
approved an amendment to Utah’s constitution that defines marriage as the legal union 
between a man and a woman.  Voters also approved an initiative that restricts any other 
form of unmarried domestic union.  In response, Equality Utah incorporated a non-profit 
501 (c)(3) and 501 (c)(4).  The 501 (c)(3) of Equality Utah was incorporated as tax-
exempt organization that focused on educational activities.  The 501 (c)(4) was 
incorporated to facilitate the political organizing wing of Equality Utah that can lobby 
and participate in political campaigns.  The goal of the organization was to support the 
election of LGBT-friendly legislators from outside of Salt Lake City area (because the 
Salt Lake City legislators were too few to affect the overall composition of the state 
legislature).  They also saw the need to start an education campaign to help Utahns 
understand LGBT issues.   
 From 2005 to 2008, Equality Utah’s focus was on the Utah legislature and state-
wide policy issues.  Because the Utah legislature meets on a part-time basis (from 
January to March), an annual cycle emerged in which most legislation supported by 
Equality Utah failed to get out of committee for full floor debates.  Efforts to add LGBT 
friendly amendments to the major bills that did get passed during this time period also 
consistently failed.  The conservative positions of most of Utah’s elected officials meant 
that the legislative work of Equality Utah during this time focused more often on efforts 
to prevent LGBT-unfriendly legislation from passing than on constructive efforts to 
extend protections for Utah’s LGBT residents. 
 After many years of no success, an unexpected (and backhanded) opportunity 
arose for the LGBT movement in Utah.  Proposition 8, an amendment to the California 
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constitution to ban same-sex marriage, passed in 2008 after receiving significant and 
highly visible support from the LDS Church.  Their public support for the initiative drew 
significant negative publicity to the LDS Church in the national media.  In response to the 
negative public attention, LDS Church leaders contacted members of the Utah LGBT 
movement in order to start a dialogue.  They also came out publicly in support of the Salt 
Lake City nondiscrimination ordinance before it passed and said that same-sex couples 
should have rights regarding medical care, fair housing, and employment (Mikita 2009).   
 In 2008 LGBT leaders from the Utah Pride Center held a town hall meeting for 
citizens of Salt Lake City to talk about the LDS Church and Proposition 8.  From the 
input of citizens, it was clear that marriage was not as big of a concern as it was 
elsewhere.  Citizens at the town hall meeting talked about employment and housing 
discrimination as the biggest problem in their lives at the moment.  LGBT leaders took 
the opinions of many LGBT citizens and the “support” of the LDS Church to focus on 
passing nondiscrimination legislation.   
Equality Utah created the Common Ground Initiative where they helped draft five 
bills in the legislature that were in accordance with what the LDS Church would support.  
All of the bills died in committee hearings in the 2009 Legislature.  With the support of 
the LDS Church and many large businesses, Equality Utah responded by turning its focus 
to getting nondiscrimination ordinances passed in cities, businesses, and universities.  
Over the last two years, Equality Utah has helped 15 cities pass nondiscrimination 
ordinances (Equality Utah 2012a).   
 Meanwhile, Equality Utah continues to work with the legislature to pass a 
statewide Nondiscrimination Bill, which would add sexual orientation and gender 
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identity as protected classes that cannot be discriminated against.  This legislation has 
repeatedly been tabled in committee for four legislative sessions out of the last five.  In 
the 2012 legislative session, the legislative leadership did not allow the 
Nondiscrimination Bill out of committee.  This was despite the fact that Equality Utah 
had the support of major businesses and corporations, the LDS Church, and the Chamber 
of Commerce.  This reinforced Equality Utah focus on passing nondiscrimination 
ordinances at the local municipal level.  In March, 2012, they also worked to get more 
pro-LGBT delegates elected in party caucuses in targeted areas around the state so that 
they could influence the selection of political candidates for upcoming state legislative 
races.   
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FINDINGS 
 
 
 The findings below are organized according to the political landscape components 
outlined above starting with the institutional structure of the political system and 
followed by the sociocultural context and dynamic political opportunities.  Aspects of 
resource mobilization are revisited to understand possible effects outside of the political 
landscape on the SMOs in Minnesota and Utah.   
 
Institutional Structure and Tactical Choices 
 Aspects of the party system in each state are easily confused with events that 
could be construed as political opportunities.  The enduring characteristics of political 
party balance and dominance in Minnesota and Utah respectively represent the broader 
party system context in each state.   Similarly, formal electoral rules (such as the 
differences between an open primary system compared to a closed caucus system) 
provide structural conditions that are likely to affect political mobilization and tactics.  
Minnnesota. As noted above, Minnesota’s party system has long been relatively 
balanced and contested between the two main political parties.  For over a decade in 
Minnesota, the Governor has been from a different political party than the party that 
controls the legislature.  That has resulted in consistent access by the LGBT movement to 
the political system in Minnesota in one way or another.   
 One tactic used by the LGBT movement in Minnesota that seems to occur in 
response to the contested party system is to have as many legislators from both parties 
and around the state co-sponsor their legislation.  One LGBT leader commented,  
39 
We have a broad base of support. For a long time we had bipartisan support on 
our bills. We try to keep it broad based. A mix of rural, suburban, and city 
legislators.  We really try to make it as broad as we can.  
 
This LGBT leader recognized that Republican support of the LGBT movement in 
Minnesota can create problems for some legislators, therefore it is important to have a 
broad mix and significant numbers of legislators (including Republicans) co-sponsor bills 
to take pressure off the few that might worry about political backlash.  In some areas, 
politicians perceive a threat that Republicans who speak out in support of LGBT rights 
might be challenged by more conservative Republicans in a future primary, but this is not 
as universal or common as it appears to be in Utah.  
 A distinctive tactic used by Minnesota’s LGBT leaders to support their political 
allies from both parties is to only endorse candidates who support them openly or 
publicly.  The LGBT movement in Minnesota has benefited from a political system 
which is more contested because it creates more potential allies that can support the 
LGBT movement publicly.  By forcing candidates to come out in support for them if they 
would like to be endorsed by LGBT leaders, the SMOs are able to solidify political 
backing in legislative votes.  In the past, one LGBT leader explained, efforts to quietly or 
privately support candidates have backfired, 
We only endorse supporters.  We’ve found throughout the years that there are a 
number of legislatures who want us to come out and support them, but they don’t 
want them to be public.  They will support and say I’m with you, but don’t let 
anyone know you are doing work behind the scenes.  At some point, if they are 
scared about being out about LGBT then they are going to back out. So we only 
back candidates who come out in support of LGBT. 
 
The large number of allies they already have allows them to force candidates to come out 
in support publicly if they want the endorsement.  To increase bipartisan support, LGBT 
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leaders often encourage Republicans to co-sponsor legislation.  This process allows them 
to begin to support the LGBT movement publicly.   
The development of a LGBT Lobby Day in Minnesota was a tactic that has 
greatly affected LGBT access to legislators over the last decade.  There has been 
anywhere from 200 people to over 5,000 people attending LGBT Lobby Day to speak 
with their legislators.  A longtime movement activist speaks of the effectiveness of the 
LGBT Lobby Day, 
 So then we started having lobby day and we would bring thousands of people or 
hundreds at least to the capitol to meet with their legislators and now like 
legislators have told us before point blank, we hear you and we know you and we 
know that we have people that, we made a difference in that way… And that is 
something OutFront has had a direct impact I think on the political process so it 
makes it a little bit harder for them to take anti-gay votes because they know that 
there are people in their districts that are going to hear about it and not be happy. 
 
The LGBT leaders find this Lobby Day extremely important for the movement because it 
increases awareness of legislators that LGBT people live in their districts.  This tactic has 
been important over the last decade because it continually reintroduces LGBT citizens to 
their legislators every year, no matter which political party is in control of the legislature.   
 The Lobby Day is also important because it provides a unique opportunity for 
LGBT leaders to work with members and supporters of the LGBT community who are 
interested in the political process.  According to an article in the Star Tribune, 
“Participants spent the morning learning community organizing techniques and preparing 
to spend the afternoon lobbying lawmakers…” at the 2012 LGBT Lobby Day (Brooks 
2012).   The Lobby Day not only made legislators aware that they have LGBT 
constituents, but is also allows many members of the LGBT community to learn how to 
community organize and interact with their legislators.   
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Minnesota has a relatively open electoral system.  Anyone is able to vote in state 
and local political party primaries where candidates receive their party nomination.  Party 
caucus turnout varies depending on the year.  The majority of Minnesota’s LGBT leaders 
involved in political organizing said that caucuses and primaries have not been a major 
focus of the LGBT organizations over the last decade.   
 Utah. Utah has a very conservative political landscape compared to Minnesota.  
The political landscape is considered conservative because both the legislative and the 
executive branches have been not only controlled but completely dominated by the 
Republican Party for decades.  Republicans have a supermajority that allows the most 
important political votes to take place in closed-door party caucuses and committee 
meetings rather than during primary elections and floor debates or public votes in the 
legislature.  This makes it hard for the LGBT movement because the state Republican 
Party is not LGBT friendly and this considerably limits their access to the political 
system.  The Democratic Party is pro-LGBT, but the small numbers of Democrats in the 
legislature prevent LGBT organizations from having high amounts of access to the 
political system.  So Utah can be characterized as a more closed political system.    
LGBT leaders in Utah are keen to point out that the problem is not the LDS 
Church; it is the overwhelming conservativeness of elected representatives in the state 
legislature.  A longtime activist in the LGBT movement characterized the legislature by 
saying,  
Well I don’t think it’s the church, as a matter of fact I know it’s not the church.  It 
is the institutional mentality of, of these, they are not very representative the 
representatives.  They are representative of a very select part of the extreme 
Republican Party and they just are, they just have no stomach for it [LGBT 
issues].  
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Many LGBT leaders were very pointed in stating that the legislature is the biggest 
obstacle for any success of statewide legislation.   
The dominance of the Republican Party in the Utah legislature, and the 
domination of Utah’s Republican Party by conservative representatives, has prevented 
the LGBT movement from successfully passing major legislation.  This has caused the 
movement to redefine their goals or ideas of what progress is in a conservative political 
landscape.  An LGBT leader said, 
Progress here is not measured so much for us in terms of… we don’t measure 
progress by the amount of legislation passed. That’s one variable in the measuring 
of success. But part of our success is… what relationships we can foster, where 
we can be successful in stopping bad legislation, making it less impactful in a 
negative way.   
 
As a result, the LGBT movement has adopted tactics that concentrate on fostering 
working relationships with Republican leaders and focus on preventing bad legislation 
from being passed.   
The LogCabin Republicans (LGBT Republicans or LCR) are helpful to the Utah 
LGBT movement because they can help foster relationships with other Republicans that 
the LGBT leaders would not normally have access to.  Although the LogCabin 
Republicans are not an official caucus in the Utah Republican Party, they have many 
members around Salt Lake City.  Because of the strong association between the Utah 
Republican leadership and a strong anti-LGBT agenda, some LGBT movement activists 
have been critical of working with the LogCabin Republicans.  However, one leader 
explained how helpful the LogCabin Republicans can be, 
 So I would say that LCR is much more effective in their long term personal 
relationships that they have developed and in opening a door for an organization 
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like ours.  Because they don’t have a lot of funding, they’re not taken very 
seriously but they do have some key relationships that they have developed over 
time that have proven to be incredibly important to the work that we do. 
 
They open the doors for some of the LGBT organizations and also help protect the 
Republican Party platform from anti-LGBT issues at the Salt Lake County Convention.   
 On the other side, the Stonewall Democrats (LGBT Democrats) are the largest 
caucus within the Utah Democratic Party.  This provides increased support within the 
Democratic Party leadership to pressure members for support of pro-LGBT policies.  One 
respondent noted, “So if we have, let’s say we have a seat where we have a Democrat 
who is not pro-LGBT, that’s when Stonewall can be incredibly effective. They are the 
largest caucus in the Democratic Party in the state of Utah.”  Equality Utah is careful to 
appear non-partisan, so the two examples of LGBT caucuses within the larger political 
parties allow the LGBT movement to build relationships with the dominant political 
parties while also sustaining the support of elected Democrats.   
Utah’s relatively closed political system forces LGBT SMOs to work more 
quietly behind the scenes with many legislators.  Although the Democratic Party is very 
supportive of the LGBT movement, working behind the scenes with Republicans has 
become a very important and common tactic.  In general, the LGBT movement spends a 
lot of time proposing changes in or preventing bad legislation before it is even heard in a 
committee.  An LGBT leader explains,  
We have some legislators who will ask to have legislation drafted and then bring 
it to us and have us vet it and make sure that we’re good with it before it moves 
on. Sometimes that just looks like will you just take a look at it and make sure it 
doesn’t have any unintended consequences, how do you feel about it? They’re not 
asking for us to champion it, they just wanna make sure that it doesn’t do 
anything bad. 
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This type of agenda-setting tactic, preventing anti-LGBT legislation or decreasing its 
negative effects before it gets out of committee, was adopted because SMO leaders 
realized that most decisions are made in committee hearings before a bill is ever voted 
on.  
 LGBT leaders in Utah have adopted a defensive mindset in which they expect to 
compromise and they realize that pushing a more aggressive agenda might provoke the 
Republican majority to respond by pushing through more aggressive anti-LGBT 
legislation.  For example, a legislator recently approached LGBT leaders for input on a 
proposed Health Education Bill in the 2012 legislature that would have expanded 
prohibitions on the mention of homosexuality or contraception by teachers in public 
schools.  LGBT leaders accepted the language in the bill, but warned the legislator that if 
the language became any more conservative, they would speak out about it. When 
discussing the tactics used for the Health Education Bill with an LGBT activist from 
another state, it was clear to an LGBT leader in Utah that Utah has a unique approach to 
dealing with the conservative legislature.   
Because of the climate of our state doesn’t allow us to do much else. Sometimes 
you have to.  It’s compromise right? And if we were to be publicly supportive or 
publicly against this and in an aggressive fashion it would probably backfire…By 
being too vocal sometimes you have to take the backseat. I have found that 
approach to be quite unique. 
 
LGBT leaders worked behind the scenes with legislators to lessen the impact of the bill 
rather than speaking out in opposition.  They also make compromises so that the 
Republican majority does not completely alter the bill which would have even worse 
implications for the LGBT community.  Not pushing for further progress or maybe pro-
LGBT language in a bill such as this one is a common tactic in Utah and the LGBT 
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leaders recognize that most LGBT movements in other states would not have to be so 
cautious and work so privately. Interestingly, the legislature passed the bill, but public 
pressure from a wide range of citizens and interest group organizations (most 
prominently the PTA, Utah Teachers Educational Association, and parents groups) 
caused the Governor to veto the bill on the grounds that “it goes too far by constricting 
parental options” (Herbert 2012).  
 To gain more legitimacy with the legislature, the LGBT movement leaders always 
seek to find more straight, Republican LDS legislators to sponsor their legislation.  They 
currently have straight, LDS sponsors but they are all in the Democratic Party.  They 
would like to increase their credibility according to one LGBT leader, “I think as we 
move forward I would like to see us continue to find straight Mormon people to sponsor 
our legislation and hopefully some will be Republicans. It just gives it a whole different 
level of credibility.”  This is different than LGBT activists in Minnesota who already 
have occasional Republican sponsors for pro-LGBT legislation, and are more interested 
in ensuring a broad spectrum of sponsors.  In Utah, a Republican sponsor adds credibility 
to a bill that a Democratic sponsor would not give to it.   
Utah LGBT leaders also realize that the political landscape in Utah means that 
they have to frame their legislation differently than elsewhere. When discussing ideas for 
future legislation to formally recognize unmarried but committed domestic partnerships, 
an LGBT activist explained how the LGBT movement would probably advocate and 
organize support for legislation in a way that appeals beyond the LGBT community. The 
LGBT activist said, “I think that if we are gonna open this up, we have the opportunity to 
open the door for a lot more people if we do it that way. And I think they should have 
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access to that.”  They recognize the importance of helping other people who depend on 
each other in a relationship, but are not involved in a conjugal relationship.  By framing 
this topic differently compared to other U.S. states, they hope to appeal to a broader 
coalition of supporters and gain more credibility in the legislature.   
 Although many of the tactics mentioned above are all used to garner credibility or 
lessen the impact of anti-LGBT legislation, Utah’s LGBT organizations have adopted 
another important tactic to increase their access or credibility.  Specifically, the two 
biggest LGBT organizations in Utah, Equality Utah and the Utah Pride Center, often 
adopt a good-cop bad-cop approach in order to gain more access for the more moderate 
organization.  Specifically, Equality Utah has branded themselves as a more respectful 
and responsible organization that can work with legislators in a nonconfrontational way 
without attracting public attention.  Activists at the Utah Pride Center and other leaders in 
the LGBT community are then free to have rallies and public protests to capture public 
attention and increase support from the LGBT community.  A member of Equality Utah 
said,  
And we are more than happy to empower them with contacts and resources to do 
that effectively but we will never be the head of it. Because … our goal is to 
really be building relationships with those elected and policy makers who feel like 
we are not trying to threaten them. We are actually trying to help you keep those 
mad people from storming the capitol. That’s what we, we want to help you in 
that. So you need to keep having us at the table so we can help prevent that. It’s 
the good-cop bad-cop strategy. 
 
Leaders from all LGBT organizations in Utah are aware of this good-cop bad-cop 
tactic and recognize the benefits of a complementary approach.  It allows Equality Utah 
to foster a good relationship with the legislature while providing an outlet for the LGBT 
movement to still express its anger and frustration publicly.   
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In Utah, the Utah Pride Center is a 501 (c)(3) which means it can only educate 
citizens on the political process, but cannot lobby, work on campaigns, or endorse 
candidates.  An LGBT leader from the Utah Pride Center explains this diverse field of 
organizations,  
…[S]o it will be other activists here and outside the organizations who will be the 
loud mouth voices that will be the irritants…. And then Equality will be perceived 
as the logical, safe middle ground that the legislature will come to and say you’re 
level headed, tell us how to stop these crazy people. 
 
Therefore, this tactic allows the Utah Pride Center more freedom with tactics and 
strategies while it allows Equality Utah to paint itself as the organization as the more 
moderate organization that can work with the legislature.   
This type of tactic is notably absent in Minnesota.  The two major statewide 
LGBT organizations focus on policy gains and work together as much as possible on 
common legislative priorities.  They also have much more access to the political system 
and do not worry as much about maintaining or increasing their credibility as LGBT 
organizations have to in Utah.   
As noted above, Utah has a caucus system in which voters elect delegates to 
represent them at county- and state-level party conventions.  In Utah, each political party 
has an option to have open or closed caucuses.  The Republicans have closed caucuses 
that only allow registered Republicans to attend and vote at the local neighborhood-level 
caucuses.  The dominance of the Republican Party in most local and statewide elections 
and the fact that they have closed caucuses has been cited by many observers as the 
reason voter turnout and caucus participation in Utah is relatively low (Utah Foundation 
2011).  One LGBT activist in my interviews felt that this is why there is also low turnout 
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from the LGBT community, “We encourage people to get involved in the political 
caucus. One thing that I have found my involvement with the LGBT movement here and 
with the Democratic Party is that the LGBT population is very apathetic.”  The Stonewall 
Democrats are said to be the largest caucus, but the LGBT population in general is turned 
off from participating in state politics by the overwhelmingly dominant conservative 
political landscape.    
 In response to a relatively apathetic voting population, a major tactic used by 
Equality Utah and the Utah Pride Center has been training delegates to attend 
neighborhood party caucus meetings.  The Utah Pride Center focuses on educating their 
support groups and volunteers about the party convention delegate process.  They also 
conduct outreach to the greater LGBT community on these issues as well.  Equality Utah 
holds focused delegate trainings designed to help the candidates they endorse become the 
party nominees for particular positions.  One LGBT leader explains: 
It’s very, very targeted. It has to do with calling people in certain districts and 
saying do you have cousins, do you have friends who are already Republicans? 
Can you help us get them to a delegate training? We’ll come to your house. Like 
we’ll come train you. We’ll do whatever it takes. 
 
These trainings are targeted to certain districts and candidates in order to help the 
Republicans that they privately endorse and to encourage people to become delegates so 
that they can vote for more moderate, LGBT-friendly Republicans.   
They are also very thorough in helping people understand the caucus and delegate 
selection process.  Another LGBT leader explains, 
We plan on identifying where districts are, where their precincts are, when their 
caucus meetings are, showing up to those caucus meetings, what the process looks 
like for getting elected, what the commitment is when they are elected, and what 
kind of candidates they should be supporting. 
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Many people in Utah do not understand or participate in this process, so LGBT 
leaders find it important to follow through with the delegates and make sure the delegates 
understand what responsibilities they are taking on.  Encouraging voters to become 
delegates, Equality Utah said on its website, “In order to change the faces on Capitol Hill, 
we must change the names on the ballots. As a delegate, you have the power to make that 
change” (Equality Utah 2012b).  Equality Utah has hosted seminars online and over the 
phone that are comprehensive delegate trainings.  They have also hosted delegate 
trainings with other organizations in order to help train anyone who wants to become a 
delegate.  Delegate trainings are important to overturn voter apathy and make a 
complicated delegate system easily accessible.  As mentioned above, some Republican 
legislators in Utah are supportive of LGBT movement goals (or at least want to avoid 
doing harm to the LGBT community).  These representatives are willing to work quietly 
behind the scenes to help where they can.  They cannot publicly support the LGBT 
movement because they believe that they would lose their next primary election.  The 
LGBT leaders consider those Republicans who help them behind the scenes as allies.  An 
LGBT leader said, 
A lot of these folks are people that you go to and you say that this bill is really, 
really bad.  This is what would happen, who do I need to talk to and what do I 
need to do? And for me I see them as an ally and say okay you need to talk to so 
and so and you need to say such and such and I will follow back around. Like that 
for me, even if you’re not willing to stand next to me on the podium and be like I 
accept this work for equality.  Totally will take it.”  
 
This tactic is very unique to Utah because most Republican legislators cannot afford 
politically to come out in support of the LGBT movement.  It allows the LGBT 
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movement to take advantage of the private divisions or sympathies among Republicans 
and helps them increase their access to the political process.  
  Divisions among Republicans also helped LGBT leaders recognize the 
importance of protecting their Republican allies in local caucus meetings to defend 
against challenges from more conservative Republican candidates.  An LGBT leader 
talks about their tactical decisions to protect Republican allies, 
…I would say there is even a majority of Republicans that say look I support you 
privately, I totally get what you are trying to do, I think it makes sense, I cannot 
support you publicly.  I will lose my seat. And so that says to me we have got to 
do our due diligence to figure out how we can either get enough of you on that the 
blame is spread out. So that is actually part of our strategy for next year statewide.  
Is to build a large enough group that one cannot be pulled and targeted on their 
own. 
 
To protect these Republican allies, they endorse them privately, offer campaign help, and 
target their districts to help elect and educate delegates about them.  LGBT leaders are 
able to encourage members of their organizations in specific districts to participate in 
their local caucuses.  
While the tactic of privately endorsing supportive Republicans is often done in 
Utah, this generates internal tension and controversy among movement leaders and 
activists surrounding some of the endorsement decisions made by Equality Utah.  An 
LGBT leader discussed how the process allows some candidates, who do not agree on the 
issue of LGBT relationship recognition, to be endorsed because it is very unlikely that it 
will happen for a long period of time,   
And there had been an internal conversations to say okay we’re gonna have to 
actually run a ballot campaign before they have to so does it make sense to not 
endorse someone who is really viable, has a great strategic position but not to give 
it to them because in 15 years if they’re still in office, they’re not gonna vote for 
it… And hopefully by then we will have grown them to be with us. 
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This provokes internal debate because many LGBT leaders or LGBT constituents want to 
endorse only people who fully support the wider political goals of the LGBT movement 
(including legal recognition of same sex partnerships or marriages).  Because of the lack 
of sufficient “full” allies, the LGBT leaders in Utah seem willing to support legislators 
who are friendly to at least some of their goals as a way to have some influence on the 
political process.   Interestingly, they report that almost everybody they have endorsed 
quietly eventually come out publicly and was willing to openly support them.  This tactic 
is very different compared to LGBT organizations in Minnesota, where LGBT leaders 
only endorse fully supportive candidates publicly because there are more LGBT 
supportive legislators overall compared to Utah.  
As mentioned above, LGBT leaders have found voters in Utah and the LGBT 
community to be very apathetic in response to the closed political system.  In response to 
this, LGBT leaders from Equality Utah have created a new campaign called the I Want 
Action Campaign to help encourage allies or members of the LGBT community to 
participate more in state and local politics.  An LGBT leader explains what the I Want 
Action Campaign is,  
...We’re really past that point where people need to be like ‘hey it sucks here,’ 
you know instead of just accepting that, really feel empowered to [say] it’s time 
for you to take action right. It’s time for us to really demand action, not just from 
ourselves but from our legislators. Um and so this thing is a digital advocacy 
platform, it takes people through five easy action steps. One after another in real-
time. That’s signing a petition, that’s sending a letter to your senator, that’s 
broadcasting it to your network of friends, like hey I just took action at 
EqualityUtah.org you should too. 
 
This tactic is specifically designed to help motivate younger LGBT members and allies to 
participate in a process that they don’t often see as relevant or worthwhile.  They will be 
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initiating this campaign at the 2012 Pride Festival, and hope it will allow them to interact 
with a larger number of people and help build support for the Nondiscrimination Bill 
before the next legislative session.   
Characteristics of the institutional structure of the political system in Utah, such 
as the dominance of the Republican Party and the caucus system have created a very 
conservative political system that does not allow the LGBT movement much access.  
This is a constant problem for the LGBT movement and it will not likely change in the 
near future.  Unlike Minnesota, this has caused the LGBT movement to work mainly 
behind the scenes with Republicans and focus on committee hearings where the majority 
of decisions are made in the legislature.  However, this approach has also created tension 
between the internal LGBT community and the external community the LGBT 
movement is trying to reach.   
The competitive two-party system and relatively open election system allows 
more constant access to the political system for the LGBT movement in Minnesota.  
LGBT organizations do not need their main focus to be working with political leaders 
behind the scenes because they can work with legislators or Governors from both parties.  
The contested and more open political system allows LGBT leaders to use tactics that are 
more public and upfront.     
 
 Sociocultural Context 
 The second component of the political landscape reflects the sociocultural context 
or how sociocultural characteristics of each state shape the greater collective action 
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frames and the effectiveness of certain movement tactics.  Specifically, I expected 
religious and ethnic diversity to shape the tactics of LGBT SMOs in the two states.   
 Religious diversity in Minnesota provides a unique setting for the LGBT 
movement.  The obvious source of most opposition to the LGBT movement is from 
conservative religious groups, congregations, or organizations.  Yet the religious 
diversity of the state also creates space for many types of religious congregations to 
support LGBT rights.  SMO leaders have created a very large religious coalition in 
support of marriage equality.  Even before the amendment was put on the ballot, 
OutFront Minnesota has been working with religious individuals and congregations to 
sign on in support of marriage equality.   A movement organizer who came on after the 
faith coalition had been developed for years said, 
I’ve been working on building an even broader faith coalition. So when I started 
at here, we had a pretty diverse group of people of faith already.  We had most of 
the protestant-Christian denominations were represented there. Um we had some 
Catholics there.  We had a Jewish representative. And since I’ve gotten in there 
I’ve been doing lots of one-on-one meetings with anyone and everyone I can find 
who is interested. And I’m trying to reach out to even more communities.  
 
They focus on engaging any and all willing religious individuals and congregations to 
talk about marriage equality.  They are creating this broad coalition to show that there is 
strong religious support from some groups in favor of marriage equality and LGBT 
rights.  They also use their resources to help congregations go through an open and 
affirming process to become official supporters of the LGBT movement.   
 A specific example of how movement leaders have to craft their message 
carefully in response to the greater collective action frame relates to the role of the 
Catholic Church.  In Minnesota, the religious opposition to marriage equality is led by the 
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Catholic Archbishop. LGBT organizers are very intentional about framing this opposition 
as something coming from the Catholic hierarchy, not the members of the Catholic 
Church in order to avoid alienating the rank and file Catholic public.  A movement 
organizer describes their approach to framing this situation intentionally, 
We want to take a more nuanced approach and say the Catholic hierarchy is 
terrible, but catholic lay people are very supportive, they are allies, and we need 
them to be part of our movement. 
 
They recognize the value of incorporating allies from all faiths into the LGBT movement, 
so intentionally use framing as a tactic so they can help redefine the greater collective 
action frame by allowing individuals of many faiths to be part of the LGBT movement.    
 The LGBT movement in Minnesota is also very confident in their general 
message or frame.  They see no need to change how they frame their argument for LGBT 
rights in response to short-term changes in political opportunities.  One LGBT movement 
leader expressed their confidence in their message, “We use pretty bland rhetoric, pretty 
neutral rhetoric that doesn’t really, it usually can be backed up with facts or logic or 
whatever… We are confident in the message we have.” And another LGBT activist had a 
similar response, “It’s like no matter who I am talking to, this is what we are about and 
you’re either with us or you’re not but we’re not going to change our message.”  They 
believe that their message will be understood by many people, so they don’t find a need 
to change it in relation to the greater culture in Minnesota.   
 As noted above, Utah is much less religiously diverse, and opposition to LGBT 
protections does not primarily come from religious organizations.  While many smaller 
religious congregations already work with Utah’s LGBT movement, the SMO leaders 
recognize that support from (or at least the absence of opposition from) the LDS Church 
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is extremely important for success within the state.  Utah SMOs have been able to work 
with a diverse set of religious congregations and leaders because they specifically 
decided not to talk about marriage equality.  An LGBT leader describes this as a tactic 
that is necessary but that creates problems within the internal LGBT community, 
And we get some backlash from our internal community about that um I almost 
never talk with religious people about marriage.  Almost never… And when we 
talk to our internal community, yes you know what our goal is, full fricken 
equality right! All the way.  So it does change, I would say not just when I’m 
talking to religious people but when I’m talking to the moveable middle at large 
cause they’re kinda the same there. 
 
By taking marriage out of the conversation, LGBT leaders have found that they can make 
progress with religious leadership in Utah and a large part of the conservative culture.  
Many people in the LGBT community do not agree with leaving marriage out of the 
discussion with religious groups, but LGBT leaders use it as a tactic because they feel 
they would not be able to work with religious leaders otherwise.     
 The LGBT movement not only recognizes the importance of support from the 
LDS Church, but also understands the need to adapt their language or framing to resonate 
within the generally conservative social and political culture in Utah.  They have been 
working on material that includes Mormon stories and has a conservative voice in order 
to reach out to those who are on the fence about LGBT issues.  They do not expect most 
of the public to organize in support of LGBT rights, but just hope to start a dialogue with 
the conservative population that increases understanding and acceptance of the LGBT 
community. 
 The LGBT organizations in Utah currently reach religious individuals through 
specific local organizations, including Parents, Families, and Friends of Lesbians and 
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Gays (PFLAG), Family Fellowship (Mormons who have gay family members) and other 
support groups.   
…Well not most but a good portion of people who have LGBT family members 
and come from a very doctrinal, LDS background and needs some support to 
rectify those two things and to hold them.  And I think that once that portion is, 
once people can find some community and some safety, then you can, then 
they’re ready to start doing the work that we do. 
 
The LGBT movement recognizes the need to use support groups and moderate discourse 
to reach these the broader public.  Their support of these groups provides safe spaces to 
discuss and reconcile individual’s religious and LGBT beliefs.  They see this as the first 
step before these people can become major supporters of the LGBT movement. 
 LGBT organizations in Utah do work with an Interfaith Roundtable, but they 
mainly help out as needed.  The Interfaith Roundtable is comprised of religious 
leadership who want to broaden understanding in faith communities.  LGBT leaders 
provide support in the form of panel speakers or occasionally bring specific LGBT issues 
to the Interfaith Roundtable meetings, but this coalition is specifically for members of 
faith communities.   
The diversity of religious congregations and religious character of the anti-LGBT 
opposition in Minnesota has created a situation where LGBT leaders have tactically 
sought to create a large faith coalition that is specifically in support of LGBT rights and 
same-sex marriage.  Minnesota works around unsupportive church leadership by using 
inoffensive frames that appeal directly to individuals of faith.  LGBT activists are very 
confident in their message and they find no need to change it.  Utah recognizes the 
dominance of the conservative culture and has changed their framing to meet the greater 
collective action frame.  LGBT leaders in Utah recognize the importance of support from 
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the LDS Church hierarchy and have not yet started building a faith coalition for LGBT 
rights.   
While the state is overwhelmingly comprised of non-Hispanic whites, in the 
major cities in Minnesota there is a wide diversity of ethnic populations (Table 4).  
OutFront Minnesota has taken the lead on organizing ethnic groups around LGBT issues 
in Minneapolis and St. Paul.  They focus on outreach to LGBT ethnic organizations 
through which they can gain deeper connections in specific ethnic communities.  For 
example, Shades of Yellow (SOY) is the only known LGBT Hmong organization in the 
world.  It has been growing fast over the last four years.  Color Coordination is also 
another LGBT ethnic group focused on organizing queer groups of color.  One LGBT 
leader describes their intentional collaborations with urban ethnic groups,  
I think that we are focusing more on sort of outreach to the communities, some 
more intentional collaborations with for example Latino/Latina organizations, 
Hmong organizations, Somali organizations….We’re working specifically to 
address multiple barriers when it comes to being both LGBT and Latina. 
 
They intentionally reach out to ethnic communities and organizations and help 
deconstruct barriers related to the combination of identities associated with specific 
ethnic communities and being LGBT.  
 Compared to Minnesota, there are relatively few large or organized ethnic or 
racial groups in Utah besides Hispanics, and the Hispanics have only recently emerged as 
a significant part of Utah’s population.  The LGBT organizations I interviewed reported 
having informal relationships with organizations such as the NAACP, and they also work 
on immigration issues with local groups.  They also have ongoing dialogue with elders in 
the Polynesian community.  Although relationships with ethnic groups and leadership are 
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developing, they are still a relatively small part of their overall tactical repertoire.  Both 
the Utah Pride Center and Equality Utah recognize that they can do much more to work 
with Utah’s ethnic communities and groups.  Over the next two years, Equality Utah 
hopes to build a relationship with all members on the Ethnic Chamber of Commerce.     
 
Dynamic Political Opportunities 
 As defined above, dynamic political opportunities in each state include the degree 
of access to the political system, existence of divisions within the elite, availability of 
elite allies, and the degree of state repression.  Sudden changes in the openness of the 
system, shifts in ruling alignments, and emerging cleavages among elites may provide 
dynamic political opportunities for leaders to develop or change tactics to take advantage 
of the situation.  These political opportunities may be short-term changes in the balance 
of political power or major legislation that increases or decreases the ability of the SMO 
to impact political outcomes.   
 Minnesota has had three major political opportunities in the last decade that 
impacted the tactics of LGBT SMO leaders.  These include the 2006 successful defeat of 
a proposed amendment against same-sex marriage, the 2010 political party configuration 
change in the legislature, and the placement of a constitutional amendment against same-
sex marriage on the 2012 fall ballot.     
 From 2004 to 2006, some legislators attempted to put a vote on the ballot that 
would amend Minnesota’s constitution to outlaw same-sex marriage.  As mentioned 
earlier, OutFront Minnesota had created a LGBT Lobby Day that increased awareness 
and contact of LGBT citizens with their legislators over the last decade.  This particular 
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threat of the constitutional amendment angered and mobilized the state’s LGBT 
community and greatly increased attendance at their LGBT Lobby Day.   
That’s where we were able to have lobby days where there were over 5,000 
people there.  We were able to shock the legislators.  They had over 50-100 
people coming into their office from a rural areas.  Having the mayor take the bus 
with them. Show the depth and breadth of support for equality.  There was no way 
they could say there is no one in my district who aren’t supporters.   
 
When the lobby day started, there were only a couple hundred people from around 
Minnesota, but the threat of a proposed constitutional amendment increased the scale and 
effectiveness of this tactic.  
 The realignment of Minnesota’s state legislature in 2010 also shifted political 
opportunities in a way that forced LGBT leaders to adapt their tactics in order to be 
effective.  The Democratic Party lost 25 seats in the House of Representatives and 16 
seats in the Senate, which drastically changed the party alignment and control in the state 
legislature.   
The change to a Republican dominated legislature provoked LGBT leaders to 
focus new attention on the importance of party caucuses as a venue for political activism.  
In Minnesota, anyone is able to vote in the political party primaries where a candidate 
receives the party nomination, but the party nomination is greatly affected by the party 
endorsement. That means those who participate in the party caucuses are important 
because they decide who will get the party endorsement. OutFront Minnesota created a 
non-partisan caucus kit that could be used by voters from all parties.  One leader noted, “I 
think the vast majority is DFL caucuses but the caucus kit isn’t just one-party, it’s a 
multi-partisan document. But it’s probably going to be harder in Republican caucuses to 
pass any of our resolutions and things like that.”  The kits explain the process of party 
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caucuses and how voters can become a delegate at the state convention.  They also 
recommend specific resolutions to be introduced to the party platform, but they recognize 
these will probably be less influential in the Republican Party.  The focus on the party 
caucuses has manifested differently in Minnesota compared to Utah.  Minnesota created 
this caucus kit whereas Utah is much more focused in finding targeted delegates and 
helping them through the process.  Although the party caucuses are part of the election 
system, the political changes in legislative party balance of power caused the LGBT 
organization to develop a new tactic.   
Meanwhile, Governor Pawlenty was in office from 2003-2011 and was infamous 
for vetoing all LGBT-friendly legislation. During that time, SMO leaders struggled to get 
their positive legislation adopted.  One leader noted: 
He vetoed anything good and signed everything bad.  At that point of course we 
had more pull with the legislature so we could usually get some bad stuff killed or 
watered down or something in the legislature so that it wasn’t, there wasn’t too 
much for us to worry about Pawelenty signing.  But it was about Pawlenty 
vetoing particularly the safe schools bill.  So yeah that administration pretty much 
locked us out.   
 
Unlike Utah, the LGBT movement in Minnesota had relied on public support for key 
legislators and the Democratic Party’s control of the legislature to block or weaken anti-
LGBT legislation, whereas LGBT leaders in Utah were forced to work privately with 
supportive Republicans to achieve the same effect.  In addition, the LGBT movement in 
Minnesota has also been able to help support multiple pieces of pro-LGBT legislation 
each session (though much of this was vetoed by the governor).   
 The Safe Schools for All Bill provides a great example of how the LGBT 
movement changed tactics in response to the election in 2010.  Before the election, to try 
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and get legislation passed without a veto from the Governor, the LGBT movement had 
built a very large coalition of over 40 organizations from across the political spectrum 
who supported the Safe Schools for All Bill.  This coalition deliberately broadened the 
groups protected under anti-bullying law to prohibit harassment based on race, sex, and 
religion, in addition to gender identity or sexual orientation.  LGBT leaders worked with 
many groups in this coalition to pass legislation that is not just LGBT related but would 
greatly benefit the LGBT community, hoping that this would pressure Governor 
Pawlenty to sign the bill.  Yet while the governor actively worked to find a compromise 
on the bill, and though it passed with large bipartisan support in the legislature, he still 
vetoed it in 2009.    
 By contrast, the switch in party control of the legislature in 2010 meant the loss of 
ready access to the most LGBT-friendly political party.  In response, while LGBT leaders 
continued to build an even bigger coalition in support of the Safe Schools for All Bill, 
they also started to work directly with youth to create an anti-bullying movement and a 
network of Gay-Straight Alliances (GSA) in high schools.  An LGBT organizer 
explained, 
So building on the comprehensiveness of the coalition which directly grows the 
comprehensiveness of the issue. So building a coalition but also getting youth 
involved in the movement to lead the movement.  So tactics around there have 
been building a youth led anti-bullying movement, identifying youth leaders, and 
identifying community members to help lead the way. 
 
This tactic of building youth leaders and a GSA network was specifically geared at 
broadening the LGBT movement behind this legislation, but also making direct impacts 
in the schools in ways that did not rely on a legislative victory.  The youth leaders will be 
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able to testify at committee hearings in the legislature and build a bigger support network 
that might impact the climate in schools.   
As noted above, the massive switch in political party power in the legislature was 
matched by a switch in the executive branch.  Governor Dayton, a very LGBT supportive 
Democrat, was elected to office in 2010.  After the Safe Schools for All Bill was not 
allowed out of committee in the 2011 and 2012 legislative sessions, LGBT leaders found 
a way to work with pro-LGBT Governor Dayton.  All three LGBT organizations worked 
together with friendly legislators and the Governor to create a Anti-bullying Taskforce.  
One LGBT leader explained, “The governor put together, just created a taskforce on Safe 
Schools and we have had a pretty active behind the scenes role in helping the governor 
select some candidates for that committee and um things like that.”  These organizations 
worked with the pro-LGBT Governor to prepare an Anti-bullying Taskforce that will 
evaluate school districts around Minnesota.  “The task force is expected to take testimony 
from parents, teachers, bullying experts and students who have been targeted by bullies. 
Dayton even wants the task force to better define what bullying, harassment and 
intimidation mean” (Post 2012).  The LGBT organizations were also successful at 
helping get members of their organizations or pro-LGBT supporters and legislators to be 
on the commission. 
 Tactics such as creating an Anti-bullying Taskforce and working directly with 
youth and high schools to create leaders and develop local anti-bullying programs were a 
direct response to the 2010 switch in political power in the legislative and executive 
branches.  These tactics also help the Minnesota LGBT movement continue to make 
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progress building a bigger movement at a time when they were unlikely to make progress 
in the state legislature.   
 Another political opportunity arose in 2011, when the Republican majority in the 
legislature voted to place a constitutional amendment on the 2012 ballot to restrict the 
definition of marriage to a union between a man and a woman.  Public and private 
divisions among moderate and conservative Republicans have since emerged over 
whether or not to support the amendment.  Noted one respondent:  
I think what Dibble (DFL Senator) did for us was that there were a number of 
Republican Senators who came up to him and said after the vote on the 
constitutional amendment, came up to him and said I wanted to support you but I 
couldn’t take that vote.  Basically meaning that they knew if they voted the way 
their conscious was telling them to vote that they would lose the election in 2012. 
 
Even though many Republicans wanted to vote against putting the amendment on the 
ballot, they felt pressured by the Republican Party not to support it.  There was a threat 
that if they voted against it, the Republican Party would run another Republican against 
them in the next primary.  Although the Republican Party pressured legislators to vote for 
the amendment, there were four Republicans who did not agree with the Republican 
Party’s decision to put this amendment on the ballot.  These four Republicans voiced 
their dissent very publicly during the hearings in the legislature about the amendment.  
One activist recounts these representatives begging other Republicans to stand up against 
this amendment, 
I remember when John Kriesel (Republican) …And he stood up and he said I 
know that there are Republicans here who are on the fence about this. And I’m 
begging you, I’m pleading with you to vote no with me. I’ve got your back. Tim 
Kelly, who is another Republican legislator, Tim Kelly has your back. All those 
people out there cheering have your back. 
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This amendment created a division among Republicans and resulted in a very public plea 
by Republicans to go against the platform of the Republican Party.   
The divisions in the Republican Party created a political opportunity that LGBT 
leaders took advantage of.  The organizations worked to support the vocal Republicans 
and in return, these Republicans have become very active in the campaign against the 
amendment.  All four Republicans who voted against the amendment are on the board of 
directors for the Minnesotans United for All campaign, the coalition created to defeat the 
amendment.  In fact, the constitutional amendment has united diverse groups and LGBT 
leaders have garnered support for defeating the proposal from almost every political 
party, 
The DFL is on our Minnesotans United for All Board.  Actually we have 
somebody from every political party except the Tea Party.  The Independents, I 
think the Libertarians are there, we have Republicans and Democrats. And the 
Republicans, a bunch of them said they don’t support the Republican Party itself 
that they don’t support the amendment.  
 
LGBT leaders from all three statewide LGBT organizations have worked to make sure 
the campaign represents all political parties and the political divisions in the Republican 
Party have made this possible.  This tactic is used to show that it is not a partisan 
campaign; it stretches beyond political parties.   
 OutFront Minnesota is also concentrating on using the upswelling of opposition to 
build a coalition of cities, businesses, organizations, religious congregations, and 
individuals who are against the amendment.  An LGBT leader explains the position of 
OutFront Minnesota, “For us, in this giant campaign that we are building, we are one 
coalition partner in this giant coalition.”  They are also focused on developing all the 
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networks and local organizations and leaders they have been building over the last couple 
decades. 
Making everything into an opportunity is important.  The biggest test ever – the 
constitutional amendment.  Taking the scale of work OutFront Minnesota is doing 
and okay this has gotta be really efficient and bigger than anything we ever built 
in Minnesota… Not changing our work; deepening and developing more and 
improving. 
 
The amendment on the ballot will provide the biggest challenge the LGBT movement has 
ever faced in Minnesota and it will greatly test the leaders and networks OutFront 
Minnesota has built.  On the other hand, they consider this amendment an opportunity to 
strengthen everything they have already been doing and recognize that it has mobilized 
many people to participate in the political process and generated new streams of financial 
and organizational resources for the Minnesota LGBT movement.  
A major tactic in Minnesota has always been to build a strong statewide 
movement to achieve marriage equality, passage of Anti-Bullying Laws, and reform of 
515 state statutes that do not recognize same-sex partners.  Coalition building is one of 
the most important tactics to building a large LGBT movement in Minnesota.  Outfront 
Minnesota comments on their website, “OutFront Minnesota works closely with the staff 
at Minnesotans United and Project 515 to develop the strategies to defeat the anti-
marriage amendment, and to organize leaders from various political parties, communities 
of color, faith, labor and other progressive groups” (2012b).  Coalition building helps 
organize the religious and ethnic diversity in Minnesota as well as takes advantage of the 
progressive network of organizations that has been established.   
The competitive balance of political parties combined with an open political 
system has given them many opportunities to build a large LGBT movement.  It also 
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allows them to turn anti-LGBT events into positive political opportunities such as the 
amendment.  So even though this could hurt a major goal – same-sex marriage – of the 
LGBT movement in Minnesota, the LGBT leaders are taking advantage of the 
opportunity to continue to build the statewide movement.  The LGBT leaders recognize 
that the campaign and extra staff will go away no matter what the outcome of the 
amendment is in the fall.  Therefore, building a greater movement while they have more 
resources is very important.  They are prepared with four different plans depending on 
the different outcomes in the 2012 election. 
We are looking at four different options for the amendment: supportive legislature 
and defeat amendment, supportive legislature and amendment passes, non-
supportive legislature and defeat amendment, and non-supportive legislature and 
amendment passes.  Four scenarios and four different strategies for development, 
organizing, policy. 
 
Once again, it shows how important the party configuration of the legislature is and the 
actual amendment outcome to any tactics in the future.   
 In Utah, three recent political opportunities or defeats have affected tactical 
choices.  These include the passage of Nondiscrimination ordinances in Salt Lake City 
and Salt Lake County, the LDS support of Proposition 8 in California, and the continual 
defeat of a statewide Nondiscrimination Bill with higher levels of support. 
Just before the legislative session in 2010, Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County 
passed Nondiscrimination ordinances that made sexual orientation and gender identity 
protected characteristics in employment and housing decisions.  This was the first time 
those phrases had been codified into law in Utah and it provoked a very hostile response 
from conservative representatives in the state legislature.  According to an article in  The 
Associated Press, “Johnson [Democratic Legislator] agreed to a moratorium on seeking 
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any gay rights legislation last session to protect a Salt Lake City anti-discrimination 
ordinance from coming under assault by conservative state lawmakers” (2010).  As one 
LGBT leader described it,  
Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County had both passed theirs before the leg session 
and there were no fewer than five bills that were aimed at directly eviscerating 
those protections and so we negotiated a stand down. No pro-bills, no anti-bills, 
no LGBT bills this session. We called a truce basically and it was a hands off 
session which had a very mixed reaction from all sides. It was very mixed.  
 
Even though the LGBT movement had a major success at the local level, the legislature 
reacted in a repressive manner.  Using their contacts with sympathetic Republican 
legislators, LGBT leaders quickly and quietly negotiated a truce with the legislature that 
prevented all sides from proposing or passing any legislation for or against the LGBT 
movement in 2010.  This included withdrawing tentative proposals to extend statewide 
the local nondiscrimination protections.   
On the other hand, negative media attention in 2008 of the LDS Church’s support 
of Proposition 8 in California provided a positive political opportunity for Utah’s LGBT 
movement.  The negative publicity led Church leaders to come out publicly in support of 
some forms of LGBT protections short of marriage equality.  Specifically, they endorsed 
the local nondiscrimination ordinances and opposed efforts to roll back these newly won 
protections.  While they did not openly work with LGBT groups, the pronouncements of 
the LDS Church leaders helped prevent the five anti-LGBT bills from passing out of 
committee in 2010.   
After the 2008 legislative session where all five LGBT bills were tabled in 
committee, LGBT leaders decided to scale back their statewide legislative efforts (Falk 
2010).  The only major legislation LGBT leaders tried to pass was the Nondiscrimination 
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bill in 2009 and 2011 and they tried to do this by taking advantage of the public support 
from the LDS church.  The Nondiscrimination Bill was defeated in committees both 
years.  In 2012, public support from major corporations and the Chamber of Commerce, 
with continued support from the LDS Church, added to the growing hope and 
expectations of success for the LGBT movement.   Despite that growing support, in 2012 
legislative session, the bill was not allowed out of committee.  One LGBT activist 
commented,  
That was a huge step and that took from then in 2008 to now to even get to the 
point where we had Chamber of Commerce members, who are very conservative, 
coming up to the Capitol saying we want this.  We had Ebay saying we’re not 
going to bring 5,000 jobs to Utah because you are not going to do this. 
 
LGBT leaders did not understand what else would help convince the legislature to pass a 
statewide Nondiscrimination Act.  Even local media and community members didn’t 
understand why this bill hadn’t been let out of committee, “This year marks the fourth 
time that the Legislature has rejected this bill – even though it is supported by more than 
two-thirds of Utahns, including our state’s leading employers” (Rosky 2012).  Using a 
broad base of support and public support as a tactic did not even phase the legislature 
because the bill did not even get out of committee.  
 While discouraged about prospects for working at the state level, Utah’s LGBT 
leaders used the LDS Church support as an impetus for expanding efforts to pass 
Nondiscrimination ordinances in other local cities and counties across the state.  This new 
tactic was to build local support that would eventually achieve conditions for passing a 
statewide Nondiscrimination Bill.  Over the last two years, the LGBT movement in Utah 
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has focused much of their work on the municipal level.  An LGBT leader describes how 
they came to this, 
What does that look like? This community in my perspective was at a place of 
like were never gonna win up there. We keep coming up, coming up, coming up, 
and coming up, and getting the shit kicked out of us. And there was, I think, in my 
perspective I think there was a great sense of disempowerment and 
disengagement. Like why the hell are we doing this? It looks the same. Or what 
you do manage to get passed is really so stripped that it doesn’t have a lot of 
implication. So it was at that point that we developed the strategy of okay, it’s 
gonna, yeah we are gonna actually start focusing on if I can get this school to pass 
this policy, that’s a win for us. 
 
School boards, city councils, businesses, and corporations are all important to their 
definition of progress.  Nondiscrimination ordinances have been their primary goal and 
they have been passed in 15 cities around Utah.  The conservative political landscape and 
constant political defeats at the state legislature have caused the LGBT organizations to 
focus more at the municipal level where they feel they have more political access.  One 
respondent noted: 
So I think two things made us change that: One was the realization that like wow 
we really can build strong coalitions, strong community coalitions, and district 
coalitions or city coalitions. Like more than we thought we could.  And that has a 
long term that can give us a second piece was we are not going to be successful at 
passing an enumerated statewide policy until different people are sitting up there.  
So how do we get that done? And it literally frames a lot of our work.   
 
This focus on the municipal level ordinances and on building community coalitions, 
which will hopefully affect the state legislature in the future.  Although new political 
opportunities came about for the LGBT movement (LDS and Business support), LGBT 
leaders recognize that it is the Republican dominated legislature that is preventing 
statewide legislation from being passed.   
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 LGBT leaders understand how important the support of the LDS Church has been 
for certain cities and counties in order to pass Nondiscrimination ordinances,  
 Well, for the LDS Church, their role is huge… I have to say honestly if we hadn’t 
had the statement of support from the Church for Salt Lake City ordinances, the 
ordinances would have passed in Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County, but I don’t 
know if they would have passed in a lot of other areas. Candidly, I can almost 
guarantee they wouldn’t have passed in Logan, not a shot. 
 
In Minnesota, the three political opportunities were used to develop new tactics and 
increase the effectiveness of old tactics.  These short-term political opportunities have 
only encouraged the LGBT movement in Minnesota to continue to build a bigger 
movement and develop leaders and organizations around the state.  Meanwhile, political 
defeats and repression from the legislature in Utah has caused the movement to switch to 
a new tactic as a means to achieve a statewide Nondiscrimination Act even after major 
support from corporations and the LDS Church.   
 
Resource Mobilization 
 Resources, whether in terms of financial or human, have been found to be 
important contributors to the innovation of SMO tactics (Freeman 1983; McAdam 1983; 
McCammon 2003).  Although this study focused mainly on how components of the 
political landscape affected tactics and strategies, questions were asked to find out if 
resources and social networks had an impact on tactics and strategies.  
Financial Resources. Support for Minnesota’s LGBT movement is at a level it 
has never been at.  All three organizations have been securely funded and have greatly 
increased their funding since 2008.  The amendment has only brought more funding in 
for these organizations and the campaign against the amendment.  Even during difficult 
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financial times in 2007 when the staff of OutFront Minnesota was cut in half, an LGBT 
leader said, “So it really cut in but again I can't really think of anything that really 
suffered. Which maybe says something right there. I just can't think of something we 
didn't do because we didn't resources and staff.”  The movement was able to pursue all 
their major goals during hard financial times.   
The majority of funding in Utah goes towards the Utah Pride Center.  They have 
hired four more staff which brings their total to 17 fulltime staff.  Equality Utah, with 
four staff and one part-time staff, finds it harder to sustain one part of their organization, 
the c(4).   
 Our c4 is always our hardest org[anization] to raise money for and I don't know 
why right because policy gain is so important but it seems so people don't wanna 
pay you to lobby I guess cause it sounds so greasy… Last year was actually the 
first year we didn't lose money in our c4. 
 
Even though it is harder to fund the political side of the LGBT movement, they seem to 
be increasing their financial resources.   
Financial resources have not presented a problem to the major movement goals in 
Minnesota, but Equality Utah does seem to be affected by a lack of funding for political 
organizing, lobbying, and endorsing.  One thing Equality Utah has done to circumvent 
having a lawyer on staff is that they have a panel of 15 volunteer attorneys who consult 
on legislation.  
 Human Resources.  As stated above, Minnesota has been actively organizing 
leadership around the state.  The leadership capacity is huge and it is growing in response 
to having the amendment on the ballot.  An LGBT leader noted, “We’re going to use the 
amendment as an opportunity to build our movement, to develop leaders across the state 
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and because of this campaign we will have a stronger LGBT movement in Minnesota.”  
Leadership development is and has been one of the main focuses of the LGBT movement 
in Minnesota over the last seven years.  They are actively organizing leaders in various 
areas: faith, anti-violence, ethnic groups, high schools, colleges, and progressive policy.  
 Both organizations in Utah have switched their focus to organizing and training 
new local leadership and have engaged in outreach to programs around the state.  It does 
not seem anywhere near as extensive in the multiple areas that Minnesota LGBT leaders 
are developing, but they have broadened their focus to developing local programs around 
the state and developing allies in cities around the state.  Equality Utah recently hired 
their first staff member who is not on the Wasatch Front.   
The LGBT movements in both Minnesota and Utah each have hundreds of 
volunteers, sometimes reaching over a thousand around each state’s major Pride Festival.  
Equality Utah has one to two interns at a time whereas Minnesota has over ten interns in 
different programs almost year around.  Both LGBT movements seem to have an 
abundance of volunteers and there doesn’t seem to be a difference in affect of those 
volunteers between movements.   
 It is hard to tell the exact impact of financial and human resources for the LGBT 
movements in Utah and Minnesota because there are not many examples of SMOs going 
without any major resource.  Financial resources are in abundance in Minnesota and they 
are directed toward the older, community organization in Utah, The UT Pride Center.   
Equality Utah still has major funding sources and LGBT leaders find ways to circumvent 
financial resources with human resources.    
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Social Networks. The LGBT leaders in Minnesota also work with a large number 
of ethnic and progressive organizations on broader issues related to people of color, even 
when unrelated to the goals of the LGBT movement.  Minnesota has a large progressive 
coalition working on grassroots organizing on policy around the state.  This coalition is 
called TakeAction Minnesota and OutFront Minnesota is one of 26 organization 
members of the coalition.   TakeAction MN has been focused on building a grassroots 
pan-progressive movement of labor, environmental, LGBT, immigration, and ethnic 
rights since 2005.   
TakeAction MN with the Somali Action Alliance.  We work on non-LGBT issues 
with them but I think we try to work with a lot of different kinds of groups – both 
LGBT and non-LGBT – that work with communities of color.  That worked has 
increased around the amendment. 
 
Overall, ethnic diversity in urban areas in Minnesota has increased LGBT leaders’ 
attention to ethnic groups and the importance of organizing them around the marriage 
amendment. OutFront Minnesota focuses on building coalitions of faith, ethnic groups, 
and progressive organizations.  The majority of these organizations support the LGBT 
movement and have taken action against the amendment.   
LGBT organizations in Utah are also working with issue based organizations on 
labor and immigration, but they are working with them differently than Minnesota.  They 
are trying to build coalitions with these groups and support them on their issues because 
they believe that all issues affect members of the LGBT community.  One LGBT leader 
noted, 
I think it's also making sure that when labor has an issue that's impacting their 
employees, then we make sure that that information goes up on our Facebook and 
that we drive people to those events. And the same is true if it has to do with, if 
it's an immigration issue, then we put it up on our Facebook, and we drive our 
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staff go. We go and talk to people and are present for those things to say look we, 
this is our issue, how can we help?   
 
So it is important to these LGBT organizations that they work with other issue based 
groups and show that they are dedicated to other causes that aren’t solely LGBT.  This is 
different than Minnesota because the LGBT organizations are still building these 
coalitions or relationships with other organizations whereas OutFront Minnesota is one of 
the main organizations involved in the massive progressive coalition.   
The availability of leaders in Minnesota is a major human resource for the LGBT 
movement, but it has also been part of their organizing philosophy over the last two 
decades.  Although LGBT organizations in Utah have recently started building leadership 
and organizations around the state in the last few years, they have an abundance of 
volunteers.  Overall, financial and human resources are important for the organizations in 
this study, but they did not contribute to any major tactical or strategic decisions.  Social 
networks of other progressive organizations can be found in both Minnesota and Utah, 
but they look different in each state.  The openness of Minnesota’s political landscape has 
allowed a large progressive coalition to develop whereas LGBT organizations are still 
fostering relationships and coalitions with other progressive coalitions in Utah.      
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
  
It is now important to revisit the guiding research questions:  How does the 
political landscape of Utah and Minnesota affect the tactics and strategies that LGBT 
social movement organizations pursue as they seek to protect the rights and well-being of 
the LGBT community?  Within this broader question, I focused on two subquestions: (a) 
Are there certain parts of the political landscape that have more influence on SMO 
choices of tactics and strategies? and (b) Is there a distinctive set of tactics adopted by 
SMOs working in more closed or conservative political landscapes? 
Minnesota’s more open and competitive political landscape has allowed LGBT 
organizations to use tactics that are much more open and direct.  Specifically, the 
competitive two-party system allows for the use of tactics such as only endorsing 
candidates publicly, focusing on building a broad bipartisan base of sponsors for LGBT 
legislation, working with other SMOs to create large coalitions, and sponsoring an LGBT 
Lobby Day.   
By contrast, the closed and conservative political landscape of Utah means that 
most important political decision-making takes place behind closed doors in committee 
hearings and party caucuses.  The more prominent tactics used by LGBT organizations in 
Utah include using both public and private political endorsements, and working to find 
more LDS, Republican sponsors of pro-LGBT legislation. They also work to maintain 
credibility with moderate Republicans to ensure they are consulted on legislation that 
might adversely affect LGBT interests. Unlike Minnesota, LGBT organizations are able 
to use a good-cop bad-cop tactic in order to increase the credibility of the one SMO that 
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is most active in working for institutional policy change.  The closed political system has 
also resulted in a focus on targeted party caucus delegate trainings, which is something 
that has never really been a concern in Minnesota because of the relatively open election 
system. 
According to Kitschelt (1986), greater institutional access to political decision 
makers generally has been found to make social movement actors less likely to turn to 
disruptive tactics.   This is found in Minnesota where LGBT organizations have greater 
institutional access to political decision makers and they rarely turn to disruptive tactics.  
In Utah, although LGBT organizations have limited access to political decision makers, 
they also have rarely turned to disruptive tactics.  After five years of continual defeat on 
the Nondiscrimination Bill, a brand-new, smaller organization in Utah organized a public 
rally in 2012.  Other than this example, the major LGBT organizations have used other 
forms or levels of institutional tactics and strategies rather than disruptive tactics.  Similar 
to Minnesota, Utah rarely uses disruptive tactics.  
The second component of the political landscape, the sociocultural context, 
greatly affects how each movement uses certain tactics and how it adapts to or works to 
change the greater collective action frame.  The broader religious and ethnic diversity (in 
urban areas) in Minnesota has increased the LGBT movement’s ability to build 
coalitions. The open culture of Minnesota has also given the LGBT movement 
confidence in how they frame their message.  They are bold and up front about their 
direct support for LBGT rights, but try to use inoffensive frames to defuse the impact of 
unsupportive religious leaders (particularly in the Catholic Church).   
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The relative lack of religious and ethnic diversity in Utah has caused the LGBT 
movement to alter their own frame to accommodate or meet themes from the dominant 
conservative culture’s interpretative frame.  Examples of such themes might be tolerance, 
non-discrimination, and fairness (but perhaps falling short of overt sanctioning of non-
heterosexual relationships). They do not speak publicly about marriage equality and 
attempt to frame issues in ways that would appeal to more conservative people.  The lack 
of religious diversity also has resulted in the LGBT movement placing greater importance 
on cultivating the support of religious leaders from a single denomination – the LDS 
Church.  Utah’s conservative culture (and the responses of LBGT leaders) creates 
tensions within LGBT organizations in Utah because their public messages and tactics 
are often unsatisfying to their progress-oriented members and LGBT constituents. This 
tension is not found in Minnesota where the LGBT movement can operate much more 
openly and freely.   
Because dynamic political opportunities are situated within the greater 
institutional structure (including a long term relative balance of political party power), 
LGBT organizations in Minnesota have been able to capitalize on political opportunities 
that could have been potentially large political defeats. Despite recent political setbacks 
in the 2010 election, they never completely changed their tactics and strategies.  Since the 
early 1990s, they have been focused on building a large statewide movement, and this has 
remained their ultimate goal throughout all the dynamic political opportunities that 
opened or closed their access to politicians over the last decade.   
Similarly, long-term patterns of political defeats and hostility from the state 
legislature in Utah are embedded features of the dominant institutional structure of Utah’s 
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political system.  The dominance of the Republican Party and a closed political system 
has created a situation where the majority of decisions are made away from the public 
discussion.  Short-term political opportunities (such as the negative 2008 Proposition 8 
media coverage for the LDS church) have opened up avenues for progress, but not deeply 
altered the fundamental tactical approaches of Utah’s LGBT organizations. 
According to my results, Utah has definitely created a distinctive set of tactics and 
strategies compared to the more contested and open political landscape of Minnesota.  
The more closed and conservative political landscape has not only caused the movement 
to define progress or success differently, it has resulted in a tactical change to achieve 
their long-term goals.   
Taken as a whole, the institutional structure of the political system and the 
sociocultural context of each state appear to have the greatest effects on the tactical and 
strategic choices of LGBT SMOs in Utah and Minnesota.  Dynamic political 
opportunities and defeats are important, but can only be understood as being embedded in 
larger structural political opportunities and a sociocultural context that gradually change 
over decades.  Dynamic political opportunities present opportunities on which LGBT 
organizations can act, but the structured political opportunities, both institutional and 
cultural, ultimately constrain how they respond. 
Political opportunity structure and the political process model have been widely 
used in a variety of ways and the key concepts have been inconsistently used in social 
movement research (Gamson and Meyer 1996).   There has also been more of a focus on 
dynamic political opportunities and how they cause a change in tactics or the innovation 
of new tactics.  This study highlights the importance of structural political opportunities – 
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both institutional and cultural – and how they affect dynamic political opportunities, 
tactics, and strategies.   
While my study cannot measure the exact impact of the political landscape 
components on SMO tactics and strategies, it does identify important structural patterns 
behind why LGBT leaders choose certain tactics and strategies in each state.  Further 
research needs to be conducted to analyze and understand the exact impact of the 
institutional and cultural components of structural political opportunities.  It would be 
beneficial to look at other social movements in these states that do not have specific 
moral and religious opposition to see whether the institutional structures have the same 
effects on tactics and strategies.  Similarly, it would be valuable to test my initial 
conclusions by examining patterns in other states where the political landscapes are either 
closed and conservative (as in Utah) or more open and contested (as in Minnesota). 
Because the two factors are found in the same state, this study is unable to tease 
out the exact relationships between one-party political domination and dominant religious 
or social conservatism on SMO tactics in Utah.  It is unclear how these factors affect each 
other and which factor plays a more crucial role when it comes to tactical choice.  Future 
research in states with more competitive party systems but a single dominant religious 
culture (or one-party states with diverse religious and cultural context) would provide an 
interesting test case to explore the distinctive roles of each factor.  
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